Firm Dynamics and Pricing
under Customer Capital Accumulation

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic implications of customer capital accumulation at the firm level. We build an analytically tractable search model of firm dynamics in which firms of different sizes and productivities compete for customers by posting pricing contracts in the product market. Cross-sectional price dispersion emerges in equilibrium because firms of different sizes and productivities use different pricing strategies to strike a balance between attracting new customers and exploiting incumbent ones. Using micro-pricing data from the U.S retail sector, we calibrate the model to match moments from the cross-sectional distribution of sales and prices, and use our estimated model to explain sluggish aggregate dynamics and cross-sectional heterogeneity in the response of markups to aggregate shocks. We find that there is incomplete price pass-through leading to procyclicality in the average markup, with smaller firms being more responsive to shocks than larger firms.

JEL codes: D21, D83; E2; L11

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1 Introduction

It is a well-established fact that firms of different sizes and ages experience persistently different growth paths along their life cycle. Newly established businesses typically start out small relative to their more mature competitors, and this gap takes time to close (e.g. Dunne et al. (1988), Caves (1998), Cabral and Mata (2003)). A large theoretical literature, inspired by the seminal work of Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), has traditionally attributed this evidence to a process of selection on the basis of productivity differences among firms, and has analyzed how these may in turn shape firm and industry dynamics in various meaningful ways.

Recently, this view has been challenged by a growing literature arguing that, because empirical patterns of firm growth are usually based on revenue data (from which one cannot disentangle output prices from quantities), the productivity-based interpretation of firm heterogeneity may confound selection on technological productivity with selection on profitability (e.g. Foster et al. (2008)). As more disaggregated data have become available over subsequent years, new empirical evidence has shown that large cross-sectional differences in revenue across firms remain after controlling for heterogeneity in productivity, suggesting that differences in firm performance are stemming, to a great extent, from differences in firms’ idiosyncratic demand. Further, the evidence suggests that this demand-side channel of variation is persistent. Thus, firm investment in demand accumulation gives rise to differences in the life-cycle of businesses of similar productivities. Yet, little is known about the aggregate implications of this micro-level phenomenon.

In this paper, we formalize these empirical findings by developing an equilibrium theory of firm dynamics in product markets in which there is a meaningful role for a demand accumulation process at the firm level. We interpret this process as the formation of a customer base. In order to understand the role that this type of heterogeneity has for macroeconomic dynamics, we enrich the model with aggregate and idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks. We then use an estimated version of the model to explore the dynamics of prices and markups in response to aggregate supply and demand shocks, with an emphasis on how the responses are heterogeneous in the cross section of firms.

We propose a directed search model of a frictional product market in which a fixed mass of ex-ante identical buyers must search for sellers of a certain homogenous product. Sellers differ in their idiosyncratic productivity, and they post, and commit to, price contracts designed to attract new potential customers. Within a productivity class, sellers are ex-post heterogeneous in the number of buyers that they sell the product to, since their pricing decisions

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1 Hottman et al. (2016) show, for U.S. retail, that most variation in the firm size distribution is attributable to variation in demand components, while Foster et al. (2008, 2016) show, for U.S. commodity-like markets, that the (technological) productivity advantage of entrants is small and it dissipates over the first few years of operation, while idiosyncratic demand accounts for the bulk of the observed heterogeneity. Similar studies for other countries include Carlsson et al. (2017) (Sweden), Pozzi and Schivardi (2016) (Italy), Hong (2017) (France), Kaas and Kimasa (2018) (Germany), and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) (Colombia).
endogenously determine the rate at which demand accumulates. Outside of the market, idle sellers must pay a fixed entry (or “market penetration”) cost to reach their first customer. Unmatched buyers, on the one hand, trade off the ex-post gains from matching to the ex-ante probability of joining the customer base, as they internalize the endogenous probability that each supplier’s size changes through the posted contract. On the other hand, new and old customers remain loyal to the firm (even though there is no commitment on their part) because the promised continuation payoffs provide compensation for the costly opportunity of searching for other suppliers. Hence, mutually valuable seller-customer relationships develop.

In equilibrium, sellers strike a balance between instantaneous revenues (via high prices) and future market shares (via high promises). The way this trade-off is resolved depends on the size of the seller’s customer base. In equilibrium, the sign of the correlation between prices and size depends on the degree of frictions in the market.\(^2\) When costs to market penetration are relatively high, small sellers optimally decide to promise high continuation utilities in order to generate a high probability of quickly expanding their base and raise enough resources to afford the entry cost. Because of product market congestion effects, the customer capital accumulation process takes time. As firms mature, they lower their future promises and raise the price as they increasingly prefer to exploit their customer base at the expense of lowering the speed at which their market share accumulates. As a result, their markups tend to increase as they grow in size, and the firm’s rate of growth slows down. When entry costs are relatively low, however, the firm might instead be willing to lower its prices as it grows, because it has a weaker preference for rapid growth at the early stages of its life cycle. In either scenario, the endogenous customer acquisition process is counteracted by per-customer separation and exit shocks, meaning that firms converge on average to a stationary size. Therefore, on top of price dispersion, the model generates a well-defined and right-skewed firm distribution.

To solve for the optimal pricing contract, we show that the model can be solved recursively and that the policy that maximizes the seller’s expected value is equivalent to a joint surplus maximization program. This equivalence is important because it reduces the dimensionality of the state space, and even leads to some analytical tractability in the equilibrium characterization. To obtain computational tractability, we exploit that the equilibrium is block-recursive, a common property of models of directed search (e.g. Shi (2009), Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011)). This property implies that, in order to evaluate payoffs, agents need not keep track of the firm distribution across aggregate states and over time. Thus, the firm distribution can be derived independently of the optimal contracting problem, and transitional dynamics can be computed without the need for approximation methods. Further, we show that a Markov perfect equilibrium is constrained-efficient. This allows us to interpret

\(^2\) In this sense, our model does not take a stance on the active empirical debate regarding the dynamics of firm-level prices, where the literature has found mixed evidence. Foster et al. (2008, 2016) and Piveteau (2017) claim that prices are increasing in the firm’s tenure in the market, while Berman et al. (2017) find that they are slightly decreasing. Fitzgerald et al. (2017) find no dynamics of prices, and attribute growth in quantities to advertising and marketing activities.
the model as a theory of *efficient markups*, in which sellers’ pricing decisions lead to a socially optimal allocation of customers across product markets.

In the second part of the paper, we quantify our model in order to study the aggregate implications of firm-level customer accumulation, particularly regarding the cyclicality of aggregate markups. To estimate the model, we use highly disaggregated product-level pricing data for the U.S. retail sector (2001-2007), and calibrate the model to moments of the distribution of relative prices and sales. Using the estimated model, we then analyze the response of the economy to both aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks.

In this exercise, we find both level and distributional effects. First, we show that the price pass-through of aggregate temporary supply shocks (e.g. marginal costs) is incomplete: in the wake of an adverse shock, firms choose to front-load their contracts by charging slightly higher prices today and lowering the utility promised to their customers in the future. At the heart of this result is the observation that, when hit by the shock, firms choose to trade-off immediate losses to future market shares, which they achieve by inter-temporally transferring the burden of shocks onto their buyers. Since the price level reacts less than one for one to the increase in marginal costs, the markup is procyclical. In addition, we describe the effects of aggregate demand shocks on firm pricing. Shocks that lower the marginal propensity to consume by buyers generate a bust in demand and lower prices instantaneously. Since the shock mean-reverts, firms depress their promises on impact but increase prices in the transition. Overall, the markup response in this case is also procyclical. Thus, the model provides a micro-founded explanation for procyclical price-cost markups in response to both aggregate supply and demand shocks. This is important because not only there is mounting evidence that markups are *not* countercyclical in the data (e.g. Nekarda and Ramey (2013)), but also because this observation is famously at odds with most modern New Keynesian models, particularly regarding demand shocks.

In our model, there are also important distributional changes during the transition after shocks. Through a decrease in the continuation promise of firms, both negative supply and negative demand shocks lead to a decrease in the number of new matches, and firms temporarily shrink in size. This implies that the pass-through is less incomplete for larger firms, as the markup response is stronger at the lower end of the size distribution. This is because (i) along the extensive margin, there is a left-ward shift in the size distribution, and (ii) along the intensive margin, a small firm’s pricing policy is relatively more sensitive to size changes, for these firms are more eager to grow. Moreover, small firms also experience a more persistent response, because during the transition the fraction of low-price, small-size firms relatively increases and takes time to adjust back.

Our paper is related to a literature where customer capital is built into macroeconomic models of firm pricing. Among early studies, Phelps and Winter (1970), Bils (1989), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999), analyzed pricing behavior under customer retention concerns. While the literature has traditionally resorted to reduced-form formulations for

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3 In these papers, firms face an exogenous law of motion for the customer base. A number of papers have
customer capital formation, we offer a micro-foundation whereby it is the seller’s commitment which gives rise to long-lasting relationships.

A contribution of our work is that we study the implications that customer-seller relationships have on firm dynamics in the context of an equilibrium model with aggregate shocks. In various contexts, previous studies have introduced a role for firm intangibles into models of firm and industry dynamics. The effects of intangibles on macroeconomic aggregates are well-understood, from labor wedges (Gourio and Rudanko (2014a)) and aggregate productivity (McGrattan and Prescott (2014), McGrattan (2017)), to household behavior (Hall (2008)) and the evolution of industries (Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012), Perla (2017)).

Within this literature, the paper most related to ours is Gourio and Rudanko (2014b). Different from their paper, we analyze firm growth and customer dynamics, and study pricing behavior when price discrimination is not possible. Moreover, our model incorporates aggregate shocks, and aims to explain the dynamics of the distribution of prices and markups.

Kaas and Kimasa (2018) enrich the Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) framework to study the joint dynamics of prices, output, and employment in the context of frictional labor markets. Menzio and Trachter (2018) and Kaplan et al. (2018) show that price dispersion can emerge from buyer heterogeneity in situations in which sellers can price-discriminate. In our model, in contrast, buyers are identical and it is ex-post differences between firms which give rise to different price levels. While a similar argument is made in Burdett and Coles (1997) and Menzio (2007), these papers do not discuss the implications of customer capital accumulation for the evolution of the firm size distribution or for aggregate dynamics. Luttmer (2006) and Fishman and Rob (2003) discuss the implications for the firm size distribution, but in neither of those papers is there a meaningful role for prices. Finally, Paciello et al. (2017) focus on how idiosyncratic productivity levels affect the pricing decisions of firms with customer accumulation concerns, whereas we aim to understand heterogeneities among sellers of the same productivity, as motivated by the empirical evidence documented by Foster et al. (2008) and others.

Various papers have related empirically demand fundamentals to the determination of prices at the firm level. Peters (2016) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) find a positive correlation between output prices and plant size for Indonesian and Colombian firms, respectively, while Carlsson et al. (2017) find, using Swedish microdata, that a substantial

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4 Firm intangibles are a substantial share of firms’ expenditures, and in the U.S. as much as 7.7% of GDP is devoted to marketing (e.g. Arkolakis (2010)).

5 In more recent work, Rudanko (2017) also studies the role of pricing for firm growth under different market structures and pricing protocols. Unlike us, she does not focus on price and markup cyclicality in response to aggregate shocks, or the distributional consequences of these shocks.

6 Unlike Paciello et al. (2017), we do not need to assume that the growth rate of firms is independent of the size of the customer base. That firm growth is inherently a function of the firm’s current size is a key aspect and innovation of our theory.
component of output price variation remains unexplained after accounting for productivity differences. DeLoecker and Eeckhout (2017) have found that smaller firms set lower markups relative to competitors within their own industry, and DeLoecker (2011), DeLoecker and Warzynski (2012), and DeLoecker et al. (2016) perform similar analyses in the context of exporting firms for different countries, concluding that markups are important contributors to differences in revenue productivity.

Finally, our paper is related to search-and-matching models with large firms. We embed directed search (e.g. Moen (1997)) into a model of firm dynamics in the spirit of Elsby and Michaels (2013) or Kaas and Kircher (2015). Particularly, we combine two technical insights from this literature. First, we exploit the property of block recursivity, which allows for a tractable characterization of the firm distribution and its dynamics. Secondly, we make use of dynamic long-term contracts (e.g. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), Schaal (2017)), which reduce the dimensionality of the state space by allowing us to condense the full forward-looking pricing problem into an amenable recursive form.

2 Model

2.1 Environment

Time is continuous, infinite, and indexed by $t \in \mathbb{R}_+$. The aggregate state of the economy is indexed by a time-varying random variable $\varphi$ taking values in a discrete and finite support $\Phi \equiv \{\varphi < \cdots < \varphi\}$, with cardinality $k_{\varphi} \equiv |\Phi| \geq 2$. The aggregate state is the source of exogenous aggregate demand and/or supply fluctuations. We assume $\varphi$ follows a homogeneous continuous-time Markov chain with generator matrix $\Lambda_{\varphi} \equiv [\lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi)]$, where $\lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi)$ denotes the intensity rate of a $\varphi$-to-$\varphi'$ transition.\footnote{For all $\varphi \in \Phi$, the following properties hold: $\lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi|\varphi) \leq 0$, $\lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) \geq 0$ for any $\varphi' \neq \varphi$, and $\sum_{\varphi'} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) = 0$. These properties are definitional of continuous-time Markov processes (e.g. Norris (1997), Chapters 2 and 3). Additionally, $\sum_{\varphi'} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) < +\infty$, $\forall \varphi$ (i.e. the economy always spends a non-zero measure of time in any given state, when visited).}

The economy is populated by a mass-one continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived, ex-ante identical buyers, and a continuum of risk-neutral firms (sometimes referred to as sellers). The total mass of buyers is exogenous and normalized to unity, but the composition of buyers across aggregate states and between types is endogenous. The total measure of firms is endogenous. Agents discount future payoffs with a common and exogenous rate, $r > 0$.

There is a single homogenous, indivisible, and perishable good in the economy. Buyers and sellers must participate in a search-and-matching market in order to engage in trade because the product market is frictional: searchers cannot coordinate into finding a match with certainty at any given instant. The product market frictions are meant to capture congestion effects in product markets with customer anonymity. One interpretation is that there exist informational asymmetries regarding product characteristics, or some aspects of...
supply that are unknown to the potential customer (e.g. the exact location of seller-price pairs). Another interpretation is that sellers may face inventory or capacity constraints, and are unable to simultaneously serve a large amount of buyers (as in Burdett et al. (2001)). These demand considerations lead businesses to invest in reputation-building in order to overcome those frictions.\footnote{Informational frictions in the product market are the preferred interpretation of Faig and Jerez (2005), Gourio and Rudanko (2014b), and Foster et al. (2016), among others.}

Buyers value the consumption of the good by the same fixed utility flow, \( v > 0 \). At any instant in time, a buyer is said to be active if she is matched with a firm and is consuming the good, and inactive if she is unmatched and searching for a seller at a cost, \( c \). These parameters possibly depend on the aggregate state of nature, \( \varphi \). Since \( v \) and \( c \) relate directly to buyers’ preferences, this state-dependence incorporates the possibility of aggregate and exogenous demand fluctuations into the model.\footnote{The source of variation in shopping disutility can be thought of as reflecting the cyclical nature of household shopping behavior, documented by Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2016) for the United States.}

We also assume no buyer is ever allowed to borrow against its future income.

Sellers belong to one of two groups: incumbent (or active) sellers, and potential entrant (or inactive) sellers. At any given time \( t \), a typical incumbent seller has a customer base of \( n_t \in \mathbb{N} \equiv \{1, 2, 3, \ldots\} \) customers, which we subsequently call the size of the seller. Each seller is also characterized by the realization of an idiosyncratic productivity level \( z \), taking values on a discrete and finite support \( Z \equiv \{z < \cdots < \pi\} \) of cardinality \( k_z \equiv |Z| \geq 2 \).

The realization of the idiosyncratic state is observable and public information.

An incumbent seller’s output is constrained by the size of its customer base. Since the good is indivisible, and because there is no benefit in leaving customers unserved, the number of units sold by the seller equals the number of customers in the base, with each customer consuming one unit. The seller also faces operating variable flow costs of \( C(n; z, \varphi) \), which depend on the idiosyncratic state \( (n, z) \), as well as possibly the aggregate state \( \varphi \). Further, we make the following assumptions:

\textbf{Assumption 1} For all \((z, \varphi) \in Z \times \Phi\):

(i) \( C \) is a continuous and increasing function of \( n \), with \( C(n; z, \varphi) \geq 0 \) and \( C(0; z, \varphi) = 0 \).

(ii) \( C(n; z, \varphi) \) is weakly convex in all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \).

Assumption 1 imposes mild regularity conditions on firm technology. It states that firm profits are continuous in firm size. The curvature of \( C \) with respect to \( n \) determines the degree of returns to scale. For now, we need not make an explicit assumption besides weak convexity. Indeed, as we shall see, equilibrium prices depend non-linearly on sizes even when

\[ \sum_{z' \neq z} \lambda_z(z'|z) < +\infty. \]
marginal costs are constant in \( n \). Similarly, the existence of a stationary distribution also does not hinge on the curvature of \( C \).

Besides serving their customers, incumbent sellers post prices in the product market. Posting a price bears no explicit cost for an incumbent. Incumbent sellers exit the market (and enter the pool of potential entrants) in either one of two ways: (i) if they go bankrupt and lose all customers at once, at an exogenous rate \( \delta_f > 0 \), or (ii) if they separate from their last remaining customer (because the buyer leaves), at an exogenous rate \( \delta_c > 0 \).\(^{11}\) These events are mutually independent, and orthogonal to the \((z, \varphi)\)-shocks.

Like incumbent firms, inactive firms are posting prices in order to attract customers and start operating in the product market. However, they must incur an entry cost \( \kappa > 0 \), which possibly depends on the aggregate state of nature, \( \varphi \). The fixed cost \( \kappa \) can be thought of as a proxy for the costs of maintaining idle product technology or, more broadly, as a cost to market penetration in the sense of Arkolakis (2010). Sellers who successfully attract their first customer (and thus start operating with \( n = 1 \)) draw an initial productivity level \( z_0 \in \mathcal{Z} \) from some distribution \( \pi_z \), where \( \pi_z(z) \geq 0, \forall z \in \mathcal{Z}, \) and \( \sum_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \pi_z(z) = 1 \). We assume free entry of firms into the product market.

**Pricing Contracts**

At every instant, sellers announce price contracts in order to attract buyers. Buyers can perfectly observe the posted contract and visit the seller posting it. For a customer-seller match formed at time \( t \), a *price contract* is defined as a sequence \((p_{t+j} : j \geq 0)\), which specifies the price level at each tenure \( j \geq 0 \), conditional on no separation. Contracts are complete and state-contingent. Thus, every element \( p_{t+j} \) of the contract is contingent on the history of aggregate and the firm’s idiosyncratic states up to date \( t+j \). Since all the relevant states are public, then \( p_{t+j} = p(n^{t+j}; z^{t+j}, \varphi^{t+j}), \forall j, t \).

The contractual environment is as follows. On the demand side, we assume no commitment to the contract, in that matched buyers can costlessly transition to inactivity if they so desire (though in equilibrium this will not occur because of the subsequent additional cost \( c \) of re-sampling firms). On the sellers’ side, we make two key assumptions. First, the seller fully commits to the contract that is posted. This means that contracts with captive customers cannot be revised by the firm for the duration of the match, and contracts have to comply with the firm’s prior promises.\(^{12}\) Second, we assume anonymity among buyers, in that the firm is unable to discriminate between new and old customers, and thus cannot index the contract to the buyer’s identity.\(^{13}\) This implies that the firm must internalize that any additional revenue from expanding the number of customers comes at the expense of customers.

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\(^{11}\) In Appendix D.1 we suggest ways to endogenize this customer separation rate.

\(^{12}\) An interpretation of this assumption is that firms have a reputational concern, so that reneging on previous promises entails unaffordable costs for them. We discuss the role of this assumption in Section 3.

\(^{13}\) Intuitively, this is meant to capture the idea that, in largely populated markets where implicit relationships develop, buyers are anonymous to the seller. In Appendix D.2 we discuss the implications of relaxing the no discrimination assumption.
potentially lowering the average revenue from the incumbent base.

**Product Markets**

A sufficient statistic for each long-term pricing contract is the promised life-time value that the contract delivers in expectation to the buyer at the point in time when the match is formed and the contract is initiated. We generically denote this value by \( x \). Let \( X = [x, \infty] \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+ \) be the set of feasible values, and let us assume that all sellers advertising the same value \( x \) compete in all such contracts. Moreover, buyers cannot coordinate their decisions among themselves. Up to the observable idiosyncratic state \((n, z)\), sellers offering the same value \( x \) are virtually indistinguishable to the buyer. Thus, \( x \) effectively indexes a product market segment.

Each seller can simultaneously post, and each buyer can simultaneously search, in at most one market segment. For each realization \( \varphi \in \Phi \) of the aggregate state, let \( B(x; \varphi) \in [0, 1] \) be the mass of buyers seeking to be matched under promised utility \( x \), and \( S(x; \varphi) \geq 0 \) be the mass of sellers posting \( x \). A market is said to be active if:

\[
\theta(x; \varphi) = \frac{B(x; \varphi)}{S(x; \varphi)} > 0
\]

where \( \theta(x; \varphi) \) is the buyer-to-seller ratio in market segment \( x \), also referred to as the market tightness. Agents take the mapping \( \theta : X \times \Phi \rightarrow [0, +\infty) \) as given when directing their search toward specific offers. In a typical \( x \in X \), a buyer obtains offer \( x \) at the endogenous Poisson arrival rate \( \mu(\theta(x; \varphi)) \geq 0 \), while a seller successfully finds a buyer for offer \( x \) at the Poisson arrival rate \( \eta(\theta(x; \varphi)) \geq 0 \), where \( \eta(\theta) = \theta \mu(\theta) \). Further, we assume:

**Assumption 2** The meeting rates satisfy:

(i) \( \eta : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \) and \( \mu : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \) are twice continuously differentiable;

(ii) \( \eta \) is increasing and concave; \( \mu \) is decreasing and convex;

(iii) For some decreasing \( h : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+ \), define the composition \( f = \eta \circ \mu^{-1} \circ h \). Then, the function \( f(x)(\tilde{x} - x) \) is concave for all \( x \in [0, \tilde{x}] \) and \( \tilde{x} > 0 \);

(iv) \( \eta(0) = \lim_{\theta \uparrow +\infty} \mu(\theta) = 0 \), and \( \lim_{\theta \downarrow 0} \mu(\theta) = +\infty \).

The first two restrictions guarantee that the problems of the buyer and the seller are well-defined; assumption (iii) is a restriction on the composition \( \eta \circ \mu^{-1} \) guaranteeing that the price-posting problem of the seller has a unique interior solution; finally, part (iv) is a transversality condition on the meeting rates.

**Recursive Formulation**

We seek to solve for the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this economy. We narrow attention to this class of equilibria in the following sense. (i) Markov-perfection means that
the equilibrium policies depend solely on the firm’s vector of payoff-relevant states \((n, x; s)\), where henceforth we denote \(s \equiv (z, \varphi)\). (ii) We look for a symmetric equilibrium in the sense that all firms within the same product market \(x\) choose to post the same contract. This is a consequence of the assumption that there is competition within each market segment, and the fact that the firm’s states are fully observable. (iii) Finally, we restrict our attention to a stationary environment, in which policies are time-varying only insofar as they are state-dependent. Thus, subsequently we drop time subscripts unless otherwise needed.\(^{14}\)

Because a dynamic pricing contract is a time path and thus a large and potentially complex object, we exploit the property of stationarity to propose the following recursive formulation. We define a recursive dynamic contract for a firm in state \((n, x; s)\) as:

\[
\omega \equiv \{p, x'(n'; s')\}
\]

The elements of a recursive contract \(\omega\) are the following. First, the contract specifies the price \(p\) that is to be charged to each one of the \(n\) incumbent customers of the firm. Second, the contract specifies the vector \(x'(n'; s') \subseteq X\) of continuation payoffs that are promised by the firm to each buyer on the next stage, i.e. under every possible size \(n' \in \{n - 1, n, n + 1\}\) and exogenous state \(s' \in \{(z', \varphi), (z, \varphi')\}\). By stationarity, contracts are rewritten every time the seller changes sizes or productivity, or if an aggregate shock hits, and they remain in place otherwise (i.e. \(x'(n'; s') = x\) when \(n' = n\) and \(s' = s\)). Notice, finally, that the contract is not indexed to the aggregate distribution of agents across states. This is an implication of the property of block recursivity, which we take as given and we discuss in some detail in Section 2.5.

### 2.2 Buyer’s Problem

#### Inactive Buyers

Let us now describe the value functions of each type of agent in the economy. Let \(U^B(\varphi)\) be the expected value of an inactive buyer in state \(\varphi \in \Phi\). The buyer enters the market segment that offers the highest valuation, and therefore:

\[
U^B(\varphi) = \max_{\tilde{x}(\varphi) \in X} u^B(\tilde{x}(\varphi); \varphi) \tag{1}
\]

where \(u^B(x; \varphi)\) is the value of searching in market \(x\), satisfying the HJB equation:

\[
r u^B(x; \varphi) = -c(\varphi) + \mu(\theta(x; \varphi)) \left( x - u^B(x; \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( u^B(x; \varphi') - u^B(x; \varphi) \right) \tag{2}
\]

\(^{14}\) We restrict ourselves to a Markov perfect equilibrium in order to obtain unique predictions for prices. However, in these type of models with dynamic contracts and commitment, real variables are uniquely determined even when this restriction is not imposed. The reason is that sellers find it equivalent to change current prices for future promised utilities.
for any \( x \in \mathcal{X} \). Equation (1) states that the inactive buyer searches in the product market that promises the highest expected value, \( \hat{x}(\varphi) \). The value of entering market \( x \) incorporates the search cost \( c(\varphi) > 0 \), and the option value of matching with a firm within said market. The last additive term in equation (2) incorporates the expected change in value due to a change in the aggregate state.\(^{15}\)

Since inactive buyers choose the best market to search in, all active markets must be equally attractive ex-ante. Therefore:

\[
\forall (x, \varphi) \in \mathcal{X} \times \Phi : \ u^B(x; \varphi) \leq U^B(\varphi), \ \text{with equality if, and only if, } \theta(x; \varphi) > 0
\]

This says that a market either maximizes ex-ante payoffs for the inactive buyer, or it remains unvisited. In equilibrium, a non-zero measure of markets is active, and we let \( \mathcal{X}^*(\varphi) \equiv \{ x \in \mathcal{X} : \theta(x; \varphi) > 0 \} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \) be the \textit{equilibrium} set of markets in state \( \varphi \in \Phi \). Hence, for any given aggregate state \( \varphi \in \Phi \), we have:

\[
\mu(\theta(x; \varphi))(x - U^B(\varphi)) = \Gamma^B(\varphi) \tag{3}
\]

for all \( x \in \mathcal{X}^*(\varphi) \), where we have defined the opportunity cost of matching for the buyer in equilibrium market \( x \) as:

\[
\Gamma^B(\varphi) \equiv c(\varphi) + rU^B(\varphi) - \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi)(U^B(\varphi') - U^B(\varphi)) \tag{4}
\]

Note that, for each \( \varphi \in \Phi \), \( \theta(x; \varphi) \) is an increasing function of \( x \in \mathcal{X} \). This result is intuitive: more ex-post profitable offers attract a larger mass of buyers per seller, while sellers offering less favorable contracts to the buyer can expect to find a match sooner. In equilibrium, firms design contracts for which a low meeting rate for buyers is compensated with higher expected promised values. Further, the buyer-to-seller ratio is increasing in \( U^B(\varphi) \): when the inactive buyers’ outside option is higher, contracts must offer more attractive deals in order to compensate for the opportunity cost of matching.

**Active Buyers**

Consider now a buyer who is currently consuming the homogeneous good from a firm of size \( n \) and idiosyncratic productivity \( z \), under contract \( \omega = \{ p, x'(n'; s') \} \). The contract specifies the current price and the new continuation promises to be delivered by the seller under each new possible state. The value for the buyer is given by the HJB equation:

\(^{15}\) Notation has been economized in two ways. First, since the value of inactivity is itself an equilibrium object, we write \( \theta(x; \varphi) \) when in fact we mean \( \theta(x; \varphi, U^B(\varphi)) \). Second, since market tightness is taken as given by the agent, \( u^B(x; \varphi) \) is in fact short for \( u^B(x; \varphi, \theta) \), where \( \theta \) maps from \( \mathcal{X} \times \Phi \) to \( \mathbb{R}_+ \). Similar concise notation will be used throughout the paper.
The right side of equation (5) has different additive terms. In the first line, the first term, \( v - p \), shows flow surplus for the agreed-upon price, and the second term states the possibility of separation, due to either the destruction of the firm or the destruction of the match. The second line includes the event that a customer (other than the one in question) separates, in which case the firm becomes size \( n - 1 \) and changes the promised value to all those customers that remain captive. The third line is the expected change in value due to the firm successfully attracting a customer, in which case the seller becomes size \( n + 1 \) and implements value \( x'(n + 1; s) \in \omega \). The likelihood of the event depends upon how tight market \( x'(n + 1; s) \) is. Finally, the last two lines of equation (5) include the change in value due to an exogenous shock, whether idiosyncratic or aggregate.

Equation (5) shows that, when the buyer is captive and the seller is subject to size or productivity changes, the customer must internalize how the seller will optimally redesign the contract under the new state. This meaningful forward-looking aspect of demand arises because the seller is committing to its customers.

### 2.3 Seller’s Problem

**Incumbent Sellers**

Consider a seller with idiosyncratic productivity \( z \in Z \) who is serving \( n \in N \) customers under the promised value of \( x \in \mathcal{X} \). The seller must choose a new contract \( \omega = \{ p, x'(n'; s') \} \) to maximize the life-time value:

\[
\begin{align*}
  rV^S(n, x; s) &= \max_{\omega \in \Omega} \left\{ pn - C(n; s) + \delta_f \left( V^S_0(\varphi) - V^S(n, x; s) \right) \\
  & \quad + n \delta_c \left( V^S(n-1, x'(n-1; s); s) - V^S(n, x; s) \right) \\
  & \quad + \eta \left( \theta(x'(n+1; s); \varphi) \right) \left( V^S(n+1, x'(n+1; s); s) - V^S(n, x; s) \right) \\
  & \quad + \sum_{x' \in \mathcal{X}} \lambda_z(z'|z) \left( V^S(n, x'(n, z'; \varphi); z', \varphi') - V^S(n, x; s) \right) \right\}
\end{align*}
\]
where $V^S_0(\varphi)$ denotes the value of having no customers (which we derive below).\textsuperscript{16} The term $[pn - C(n; s)]$ is the seller’s flow profits, composed of revenue from selling to $n$ customers, net of operating costs. The next term on the first line is the expected change in value if the seller goes bankrupt, in which case she instantly loses all customers and enters the pool of potential entrants. The third additive term includes the probability that one of the $n$ customers separates, in which case the seller delivers the promised value $x'(n - 1; s)$. The second line shows that, by posting a new offer $x'(n + 1; s)$, the seller might attract the $(n + 1)$-th buyer. When making a new offer, the seller understands the sorting behavior of buyers across states for different promised values through the equilibrium $\theta$ schedule. Finally, the value of the firm could change due to an exogenous state transition.\textsuperscript{17}

When choosing $\omega$, the seller is constrained by:

$$V^B(n, \omega; s) \geq x$$  \hfill (7)

Equation (7) is a promise-keeping (PK) constraint guaranteeing that, with its choice of the contract, the seller honors the promises that were made in the past: the value that each buyer of the firm obtains under the contract must be weakly greater than the value $x$ that was promised to her.

**Potential Entrants**

Inactive firms have no customers (i.e. $n = 0$) and, unlike incumbents, they must incur a flow set-up cost $\kappa > 0$ in order to post a contract. Prior to selling the good, they must also draw an initial productivity level $z_0$ from the $\pi_z$ distribution. For each possible realization $z_0 \in Z$, their proposed contract is a promised value to their first customer.

Formally, the ex-ante value of the potential entrant in aggregate state $\varphi$ solves:

$$rV^S_0(\varphi) = -\kappa(\varphi) + \sum_{z_0 \in Z} \pi_z(z_0)v^S_0(z_0, \varphi) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi' | \varphi) \left( V^S_0(\varphi') - V^S_0(\varphi) \right)$$ \hfill (8)

This value is composed of the set-up flow cost $\kappa$ (first additive term), the expected value of posting a contract under productivity draw $z_0$ (second term), and the expected change in the ex-ante value of entry for a change in the aggregate state (third term). We have defined the expected value of entry under a draw $z_0$ by:

$$v^S_0(z_0, \varphi) \equiv \max_{x' \in X} \eta(\theta(x'; z_0, \varphi)) \left( V^S(1, x'; z_0, \varphi) - V^S_0(\varphi) \right)$$ \hfill (9)

\textsuperscript{16} The object $\Omega \equiv \mathbb{R} \times [x, x_0]^{k}$ denotes the set of admissible contracts, where $k \equiv 3k_zk_\varphi - 1$ is the number of new promises made. For $n = 1$, we note that $x'(n - 1; s) = \emptyset$.

\textsuperscript{17} Figure B.1 in the Appendix provides a graphical depiction of all possible seller transitions.
Once again, the firm understands how inactive buyers sort across markets, in that the \( \theta(\cdot; \varphi) \) schedule is taken as given. There is no PK constraint in this case as the firm does not yet have any customers.

We assume free entry into the product market for the first customer. Since the total mass of sellers adjusts freely, firms will flood into the economy insofar as the expected value of posting a contract exceeds the set-up cost \( \kappa(\varphi) > 0 \). Therefore, in an equilibrium with positive entry in all aggregate states, it must be the case that:

\[
\forall \varphi \in \Phi : \quad V^S_0(\varphi) = 0
\]

The free-entry condition thus pins down the average market tightness among single-customer firms in the cross-section of initial productivities.

### 2.4 Optimal Contract

In this section, we derive and describe the properties of the optimal contract for a typical firm. Our main result is that, since contracts are complete, and sellers and buyers can engage in revenue-neutral transfers schemes, the seller’s and the joint surplus problems are equivalent. As we shall see, this simplifies the state space and renders the equilibrium computationally tractable.

#### Joint Surplus Problem

Consider a typical firm whose state vector is \((n, x; s)\). As seen in the last section, the optimal contract \( \omega = \{p, x'(n'; s')\} \) can be obtained as the solution to the problem of the seller, described in (6). A standard monotonicity argument reveals that sellers will offer the lowest values to their buyers such that the seller’s promises are still honored, and so the PK constraint (7) will hold with equality. To economize on notation, for the remainder of the paper we write \( x \) (a predetermined state variable) in place of \( V^B(n, \omega; s) \).

Next, define the joint surplus in a typical state \((n, x; s)\) as the sum of the seller’s expected value from the match, \( V^S(n, x; s) \), and the aggregate expected value for all the \( n \) customers of the firm:

\[
W(n, x; s) = V^S(n, x; s) + nx
\]

In Appendix C.1 we show that the joint surplus can be written as follows:

\[
(r + \delta_f)W(n, x; s) = \max_{x'(n'; s')} \left\{ n \left( v(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_c)U^B(\varphi) \right) - \left( C(n; s) + \eta \left( \theta(x'(n + 1; s); \varphi) \right) x'(n + 1; s) \right) \right\}
\]  
(10)
Intuitively, equation (10) represents the joint surplus as the present discounted value of the buyers’ total surplus, net of the seller’s total costs. On the first line, the term \( n(v + (\delta_f + \delta_c)U^B) \) represents the aggregate flow surplus for all the \( n \) customers of the firm, composed of the sum of the per-customer utility from consumption and the expected per-customer gains from separation. The second line collects (inside the parenthesis) the total costs of the match for the seller, equal to total operating costs (first term) plus the expected cost of the new contract. The latter is composed of the product of the promised value, \( x'(n + 1) \), and the endogenous probability of attraction, \( \eta(\theta(x'(n + 1))) \). The remaining terms in equation (10) take into account the usual transitions (i.e. separation, growth, and exogenous shocks).

Then, we can show:

**Proposition 1 (Joint Surplus Problem)**

i. The firm’s and the joint surplus problems are equivalent. In particular:

(a) If some \( \omega = \{p, x'(n'; s')\} \) solves (6)-(7), then \( x'(n'; s') \) is a solution to (10).

(b) Conversely, for every vector \( x'(n'; s') \) that solves (10), there exists a unique \( p \) for which \( \{p, x'(n'; s')\} \) is a solution to (6)-(7).

ii. The joint surplus function \( W(n, x; s) \) is constant in \( x \).

For the proof, see Appendix C.1. Part i. of Proposition 1 establishes that the contract that maximizes the seller’s profits can be found by solving an alternative problem, given by (10). In this problem, the contract maximizes the profits of all the parties involved in a utilitarian fashion, provided that the seller extracts rents from each buyer up to the limit established by promise-keeping. Since the contract space is complete (that is, it specifies continuation promises for each and every possible future state), and both agents have linear preferences, there always exists a menu of price and promised utility that, for any future state, redistributes rents among the seller and its customers in a payoff-maximizing way.

Part ii. of the proposition follows immediately from this logic, and clarifies why problem (10) is much simpler to solve than the firm’s problem. Since price and continuation promises map one-for-one, the maximized surplus is invariant to the rent-sharing components of the contract. Conveniently, this means that the problem can be split in two stages. In Stage 1, the firm sets the vector of continuation promises \( x'(n'; s') \) that maximizes the size of the surplus under every possible combination of future states. In Stage 2, the price level implements
such an allocation, thus splitting and distributing rents among all \( n + 1 \) agents involved, by ensuring that PK binds in every single state. Further, the surplus is also constant in the firm’s outstanding promise, \( x \), for this is a predetermined state that was chosen optimally previously by the firm. Thus, given \( s \), there exists a sequence \( \{W_n(s)\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \) such that:

\[
\forall (n, x) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{X} : W_n(s) = W(n, x; s)
\]

As a result, the policy that solves problem (10) is not a function of \( x \), and neither is the optimal price level, simplifying the characterization of the equilibrium.\(^{18}\)

**Equilibrium Characterization**

By ex-ante indifference, the option value of matching for the buyer is constant across markets and given by \( \Gamma^B(\varphi) \) (equation (4)). Therefore, the tightness of market \( x \) is:

\[
\theta(x; \varphi) = \mu^{-1}\left( \frac{\Gamma^B(\varphi)}{x - U^B(\varphi)} \right)
\]

By Assumption 2.\( i \) and continuity of \( \theta \) on \( x \), equation (10) describes the maximization of a continuous function over a compact support, so there exist promises \( \{x'(n + 1; s), x'(n - 1; s), x'(n; s')\} \) and a price level \( p(n; s) \) that solve the joint surplus problem. Once again, note that we index these policies by \( n \), but not \( x \).

**Stage 1. Continuation promises** We begin with the choice of \( x'(n + 1; s) \). First, by equation (11) and differentiability of \( \eta \), the following first-order condition is sufficient:\(^{19}\)

\[
\frac{\partial \eta(\theta(x'; \varphi))}{\partial x'} (W_{n+1}(s) - W_n(s)) = \frac{\partial \eta(\theta(x'; \varphi))}{\partial x'} x' + \eta(\theta(x'; \varphi))
\]

Let \( x'(n + 1; s) \) denote the solution to equation (12). Intuitively, the optimal continuation value \( x'(n + 1; s) \) equates the expected marginal benefit of upgrading the size of the firm by one customer (left-hand side), to the expected marginal costs of such a transition (right-hand side). On the left-hand side: an increase by one util in the promised value increases the joint surplus by the amount \( (W_{n+1} - W_n) > 0 \) in case the seller makes a size transition. These gains must then be weighted by the marginal effect of the raised promised value on the likelihood that the firm meets a new customer. On the right-hand side: for every util spent on the continuation promise, the seller incurs in two associated costs. First, the direct cost of delivering the new value to the additional customer, weighted by the change in the meeting rate. Second, the decrease in the price level of all currently captive buyers of the firms, by \( \eta(\theta(x'(n + 1; s); \varphi)) \) utils, which is required by promise-keeping.

\(^{18}\) Schaal (2017) uses similar insights for tractability in a firm-dynamics search model of the labor market.

\(^{19}\) Sufficiency obtains because the second-order condition follows from Assumption 2.\( iii \) when, in the language of that Assumption, we pick \( h(x) \equiv \frac{\Gamma^B}{x - U^B} \) and \( \hat{x} \equiv W_{n+1} - W_n \).
The objects $x'(n; s')$, $s' \neq s$, and $x'(n-1; s)$, cannot be determined by a surplus-maximizing condition similar to (12) because the joint surplus is constant in these objects (Proposition 1, part ii.). Instead, these values are purely redistributive: they affect only the way in which the total surplus is split between buyers and seller. Specifically, the firm’s choice must be consistent with the sorting behavior of inactive buyers (equation (11)).

By symmetry, we have that for any two sellers of sizes $n \geq 2$ and $m$, respectively, then $x'(n-1; s) = x'(m+1; s)$ if $m = n - 2$. In words, the optimal downsizing choice for a size-$n$ seller (left side of the equality) must be consistent with the optimal upsizing choice for a firm of size $n - 2$ (right side). Similarly, when transitioning to another state, equation (11) and symmetry require that $x'(n; s') = x'(m+1; s')$ for any two sellers of sizes $n \geq 2$ and $m = n - 1$. Finally, for $n = 1$, the free entry condition must be satisfied, implying:

$$\kappa(\varphi) = \sum_{z_0 \in Z} \pi(z_0) \eta(\theta(x'(1; z_0, \varphi); \varphi)) \left( W_1(z_0, \varphi) - x'(1; z_0, \varphi) \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Summing up, the set of equilibrium markets is $X^* \equiv \{ x'(n; z, \varphi) : (n, z, \varphi) \in N \times Z \times \Phi \}$, where $x'(n; z, \varphi)$ solves (12) for each $n \geq 2$, and (13) for $n = 1$.

Market tightness levels, $\theta_n(z, \varphi) \equiv \theta(x'(n; z, \varphi); \varphi)$, are found via equation (11). Since $\theta(x; \varphi)$ is an increasing and continuous function of $x$, $\theta_n$ inherits the size-dependence of $x'$. In turn, $\theta_n$ determines firm growth rates in equilibrium. Formally, the law of motion of a type-$z$ seller with $n_t$ customers at time $t$ is given by:

$$n_{t+\Delta} - n_t = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{w.prob. } \eta(\theta_{n_{t+1}}(z, \varphi)) \Delta + o(\Delta) \\
-1 & \text{w.prob. } n_t \delta_c \Delta + o(\Delta) \\
-n_t & \text{w.prob. } \delta_f \Delta + o(\Delta) \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}$$ \hspace{1cm} (14)

for a small time lapse $\Delta > 0$, where $\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \frac{o(\Delta)}{\Delta} = 0$. For instance, when $x'$ is decreasing in $n$, smaller firms attract more buyers per unit of time by offering higher ex-post values, so the buyer-to-seller ratio is higher in those markets, and these firms grow relatively faster.

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**Figure 1**: Equilibrium tightness $\theta : x \mapsto \mu^{-1} \left( \frac{x}{x - \Gamma^B} \right)$, and set of equilibrium markets.
compared to other firms. Figure 1 depicts the different markets in equilibrium for this case. All equilibrium markets are distributed on the $\theta$ schedule defined by buyer’s ex-ante revenue equalization. To grow, the seller makes a state-contingent promise that is strictly below the current valuation of her buyers (depicted on the horizontal axis), but always above $U_B$ to keep them from separating. In equilibrium, the resulting collection of markets makes inactive buyers indifferent.

**Stage 2. Prices** Finally, the equilibrium price can be backed out of the PK constraint, which is binding. First, we replace $V^B(n, \omega; z, \varphi) = x'(n; z, \varphi)$ and the components of $\omega$ in equation (5). Then, solving for $p$ in the resulting equation, we obtain:

$$p_n(z, \varphi) = v(\varphi) - r x'(n; z, \varphi) + \delta_f \left( \frac{U^B(\varphi) - x'(n; z, \varphi)}{n} \right) + \eta \theta_n (x'(n + 1; z, \varphi) - x'(n; z, \varphi))$$

$$+ n \delta_c \left( \frac{U^B(\varphi) + (n - 1) x'(n - 1; z, \varphi)}{n} - x'(n; z, \varphi) \right)$$

$$+ \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z) \left( x'(n; z', \varphi) - x'(n; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( x'(n; z, \varphi') - x'(n; z, \varphi) \right)$$

(15)

The optimal price level can be decomposed into the following additive parts. The first one is the price level that would prevail if, in the absence of any exogenous shock, each customer were to stay matched forever with its seller and size did not change going forward. We call this term the baseline price level. The remaining terms in (15) introduce the necessary adjustments for possible changes in firm states.

To provide intuition, consider again the parametrization under which $x'$ decreases in $n$ (as in Figure 1). Over and above the baseline price, the firm first offers a price reduction of $\delta_f(U^B - x'(n)) \leq 0$ to compensate the customer for the expected loss in value in the event that the firm exits the market. We label this the exit component. Second, the term $\eta \theta_n (x'(n + 1) - x'(n)) \leq 0$ is a compensation for the eventuality that the firm grows. This compensation is thus labeled the growth component. Third, the firm adjusts the price for the event of customer separation: a reduction in size lowers the seller’s value and has a pecuniary externality on all those customers that remain matched, so the price must again be adjusted to remain compatible with the seller’s commitment. We call this term the separation component. If a separation occurs, then the separating customer obtains $U^B$, whereas the remaining $n - 1$ customers each obtain $x'(n - 1)$. This amounts to an average value of $\frac{U^B + (n - 1)x'(n - 1)}{n}$ per customer. Finally, the last two terms in equation (15) adjust the price level for expected changes in the exogenous states.

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20 Indeed, in that case we would have $p = v - rx$, that is $x = \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-rt}(v - p)dt$, the PDV of perpetually obtaining the fixed surplus $(v - p)$. 17
In Section 3 we will discuss the different price effects that may be present in equilibrium and provide some intuition for the direction of the dependence on size.

2.5 Distribution Dynamics

To close the equilibrium, we need to describe the dynamics of the distribution of agents. The equilibrium of the economy described above features heterogeneous agents making forward-looking decisions and sorting into distinct product markets in the presence of both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The distribution of agents across markets in turn depends on the aggregation of such decisions. Yet, our equilibrium characterization has been silent on the composition of buyers and sellers across market segments, or the evolution of this distribution. This is because the equilibrium is block-recursive.

In our model, block recursivity arises from two key ingredients. First, we assume that search is directed, and thus sellers’ offers are not contingent on the identity, and in particular the outside option, of the buyer. As a result, market tightness, which embodies agents’ distributions, serves as a sufficient statistic for both sellers and buyers when making decisions, and allows them to not having to forecast the evolution of aggregates over future states of the economy. Second, the ex-ante revenue-equalization condition across all markets among inactive buyers (equation (3)) implies that the equilibrium tightness on each market adjusts to be consistent with agents’ beliefs.

Because market tightness is a sufficient statistic to evaluate payoffs in this economy, the model allows for the description of distribution transitional dynamics by means of flow equations (below). This makes our environment particularly apt to study aggregate product market dynamics.

Let $S_{n,t}(z) \geq 0$ be the total measure of firms of size $n$ with idiosyncratic productivity $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ at time $t \geq 0$. Recall that all such firms are seeking new customers in market $x'(n + 1; z, \varphi)$. Let $B^{I}_{n+1}(z, \varphi)$ be the measure of (inactive and searching) buyers within market $x'(n + 1; z, \varphi)$. Then, market tightness must adjust so that:

$$B^{I}_{n+1,t}(z, \varphi) = \theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)S_{n,t}(z)$$

(16)

at every $t \geq 0$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Using that $\eta(\theta) = \theta \mu(\theta)$, equation (16) can alternatively be written as $\mu(\theta_{n}(z, \varphi)) B^{I}_{n,t}(z, \varphi) = \eta(\theta_{n}(z, \varphi)) S_{n-1,t}(z)$, stating that the measure of inactive buyers who become customers of a $(n, z)$-type firm is equal to the measure of sellers of productivity $z$ and size $n - 1$ who acquire their $n$-th customer.

Similarly, let $B^{A}_{n,t}(z)$ be the measure of customers that are matched with firms of type $(n, z)$ at time $t$. By construction, we have:

$$B^{A}_{n,t}(z) = nS_{n,t}(z)$$

(17)

---

21 Kaas and Kircher (2015) exploit similar insights to obtain tractability. An alternative approach would be to dispense of the indifference condition among inactive buyers, and assume instead free entry of firms across all markets (e.g. Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011) and Schaal (2017)).
at any $t \geq 0$. The measures of inactive and active buyers must add up to the total mass of buyers in the economy at all times, and thus:

$$\forall \phi \in \Phi, \forall t \geq 0: \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} B_{n,t}^A(z) + \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} B_{n,t}^I(z, \phi) = 1$$

This equation establishes an aggregate feasibility constraint: the unit mass of buyers must be either matched with a firm and consuming, or looking for a match.

Market tightness jumps instantaneously in response to an aggregate shock. This is because the mass of inactive buyers adjusts immediately to guarantee that the indifference condition among unmatched buyers (equation (3)) is met in all states of nature. However, by block recursivity, tightness remains constant along each aggregate state. The mass of potential entrants, denoted $S_{0,t}(\phi)$, jumps following a $\phi$-shock, and otherwise evolves smoothly due to sellers flowing in and out of inactivity in the transition. The distribution of firms, $\{S_{n,t}(z)\}$, is slow-moving and continuous in time. Because of this slow adjustment, the model thus feature sluggish aggregate dynamics.

Formally, the flows into and out of size $n = 1$ and some $z \in \mathbb{Z}$ are:

$$\partial_t S_{1,t}(z) = \pi_z(z)\eta(\theta_1(z, \phi)) S_{0,t}(\phi) + 2\delta_c S_{2,t}(z) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) S_{1,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$- \left[ \delta_f + \delta_c + \eta(\theta_2(z, \phi)) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(\tilde{z}|z) \right] S_{1,t}(z)$$

where $\partial_t$ is the partial derivative operator with respect to time. Inflows (first line) are given by successful entrants drawing productivity $z$ upon entry, and by the share of incumbents that are either losing a customer, or transitioning into $z$ from some $\tilde{z} \neq z$. Outflows (second line) are given by firms that either die, lose their only customer, gain a second customer, or transition to a distinct productivity state, $\tilde{z} \neq z$. The aggregate state $\phi$ enters the law of motion implicitly through its influence on the jump dynamics of $S_{0}$ and $\theta_1$. For $n \geq 2$:

$$\partial_t S_{n,t}(z) = \eta(\theta_n(z, \phi)) S_{n-1,t}(z) + (n + 1)\delta_c S_{n+1,t}(z) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) S_{n,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$- \left[ \delta_f + n\delta_c + \eta(\theta_{n+1}(z, \phi)) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(\tilde{z}|z) \right] S_{n,t}(z)$$

The interpretation of equation (20) is almost identical to that of the previous equation.

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\textsuperscript{22} Our notation convention is the following: (i) explicit dependence on $\phi$ denotes that a variable jumps with $\phi$; (ii) a subscript $t$ denotes time-dependence for fixed $\phi$. 

19
Finally, the measure of potential entrants, $S_{0,t}(\varphi)$, obeys the following ODE:

$$\partial_t S_{0,t}(\varphi) = \delta_f S_t + \delta_c \sum_{z} S_{1,t}(z) - \sum_{z_0} \pi_z(z_0) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z_0, \varphi)) S_{0,t}(\varphi)$$ (21)

where $S_t \equiv \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sum_{z \in Z} S_{n,t}(z)$ is the total measure of incumbent firms (i.e., firms with one or more customers). The usual interpretation applies, with the particularity that entering firms must now draw an initial productivity level from the $\pi_z$ distribution.

Equations (19)-(21) offer a full characterization of the model’s dynamics. We may now equate flows in and out of every possible state to obtain the stationary distribution of firms: $\partial_t S_{n,t}(z) = 0, \forall n,z$.\(^{23}\) As the last step, we must derive the aggregate measures of agents in the stationary solution. This is shown in Appendix F.1.

### 2.6 Equilibrium Definition and Efficiency

We are now ready to define an equilibrium:

**Definition 1** A Recursive Equilibrium is, for each aggregate state $\varphi \in \Phi$ and time $t \in \mathbb{R}_+$, a set of value functions $V^S(\cdot, \varphi) : N \times \mathcal{X} \times Z \to \mathbb{R}$ and $V^B(\cdot, \varphi) : N \times \Omega \times Z \to \mathbb{R}$; a value of inactivity $U^B(\varphi) \in \mathbb{R}$; joint surplus and prices $\{W_n(z, \varphi), p_n(z, \varphi) : (n, z) \in N \times Z\}$, and continuation promises $\{x_{n+1}(z, \varphi), x_{n-1}(z, \varphi), \{x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) : z' \in Z\}, \{x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) : \varphi' \in \Phi\}$; a decision rule $\hat{x}(\varphi)$ for inactive buyers; a market tightness function $\theta(\cdot, \varphi) : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}_+$; aggregate measures of agents $\{S_{0,t}(\varphi), S_t, B^A_t, B^I_t\}$; and a distribution of sellers and buyers: $\{S_{n,t}(z), B^A_{n,t}(z), B^I_{n,t}(z, \varphi) : (n, z) \in N \times Z\}$; such that: [i] the value functions solve (5) and (6); $U^B(\varphi)$ satisfies the free-entry condition (13), and the joint surplus $W_n(z, \varphi)$ solves (10); [ii] price and continuation promises satisfy (15) and (12), respectively; [iii] $\hat{x}(\varphi)$ solves the inactive buyer’s problem, (1)-(2); [iv] market tightness $\theta(x; \varphi)$ is consistent with the sorting behavior of inactive buyers, (3); and [v] aggregates and the distribution of agents satisfy the flow equations in Section 2.5.

Proposition 2 below states that, given the search frictions, a Recursive Equilibrium is efficient. In our environment, the planner chooses distributions of buyers and sellers, as well as market tightness levels, in order to solve:

$$\max \ E_0 \left\{ \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-rt} W_t(\varphi_t) dt \right\}$$ (22)

where welfare is:

$$W_t(\varphi_t) \equiv -\kappa(\varphi_t) S_{0,t} + \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in Z} \left( v(\varphi_t) B^A_{n_t,t}(z_t) - c(n_t; z_t, \varphi_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - c(\varphi_t) B^I_{n_t,t}(z_t) \right)$$

\(^{23}\)In general, an analytical solution for the stationary distribution does not exist unless (i) we place an upper-bound on the space of seller sizes, or (ii) we shut down \((z, \varphi)\)-shocks and assume $\delta_f = 0$. For (i), see Proposition 4. For (ii), see Appendix F.2.
subject to the cross-sectional and dynamic properties of the distribution of agents described in Section 2.5. Aggregate welfare in this economy equals the present discounted sum of consumption gains by active buyers, net of search costs by inactive buyers, and production and entry costs by firms. Using this definition, we then establish:

**Proposition 2 (Efficiency)** A Recursive Equilibrium is efficient.

For the proof, see Appendix C.2. This result implies that, given the search frictions, our model features efficient firm dynamics and efficient pricing behavior. In particular, markup dispersion is necessary to optimally distribute trade gains among buyers and sellers, as prices in our environment serve to efficiently direct buyer search toward specific product markets. The result is in contrast to models explaining dispersion in firm-level revenue through (inefficient) resource misallocation (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). While we do not rule out other interpretations, our setting demonstrates that this type of dispersion may also be generated through efficient pricing in the context of a frictional market.

### 3 Model Discussion

This section presents the qualitative properties of the equilibrium, with an emphasis on how product market frictions lead firms of different sizes to set different combinations of price and promised utilities, and to experience different subsequent growth paths. Then, we comment on the key assumptions and describe the role that they play in the model.

#### 3.1 Qualitative Features

We begin with a useful result. Under a standard matching function, the model admits a partial analytical representation in the following sense: for each given value of inactivity $U_B$, the equilibrium joint surplus $W_{n+1}$ can be found as the solution of a second-order difference equation, i.e. as a function of $n$, $W_n$, $W_{n-1}$, and parameters. Assume:

$$\mu(\theta) = \theta^{\gamma-1}$$

with $\eta(\theta) = \theta \mu(\theta)$, where $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ is the matching elasticity.\(^{24}\) Then:

**Proposition 3 (Solution of the Joint Surplus)** For each $(z, \varphi) \in Z \times \Phi$:

(a) The joint surplus $W_n(z, \varphi)$ solves a second-order difference equation in $n$:

$$W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) = W_n(z, \varphi) + U^B(\varphi) + \left( \frac{\Gamma^B(\varphi)}{\gamma} \right) \left( \frac{\Gamma^S_n(z, \varphi)}{1 - \gamma} \right)^{1-\gamma}$$

(23)

where $\Gamma^S_n(z, \varphi)$ is a function of $n$, $W_n$, $W_{n-1}$, and parameters (see Appendix).\(^{24}\)

---

\(24\) This arises from a Cobb-Douglas matching function, $M(B, S) = B^\gamma S^{1-\gamma}$. However, Proposition 3 holds for the more general CES case $\mu(\theta) = (1 + \theta^\xi)^{-1/\xi}$, of which Cobb-Douglas is a special case when $\xi \to 0$. 

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(b) Promised utility equals: $x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) = \gamma \left( W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi) \right) + (1 - \gamma) U^B(\varphi)$.

For the proof, see Appendix C.3. Proposition 3 shows that, in spite of the rich dynamics of the model, the joint surplus can be expressed in a very tractable form. The formulae have intuitive interpretations. First, in the Appendix we show that:

\[
\Gamma^B = \mu(\theta_{n+1}) \left( x_{n+1} - U^B \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma^S_n = \eta(\theta_{n+1}) \left( W_{n+1} - W_n - x_{n+1} \right)
\]

For each equation, the right hand-side of the equality gives the product of the ex-post net gain from a new match, times the probability that a match occurs from the perspective of buyer and seller, respectively. Thus, in equilibrium $\Gamma^B$ and $\Gamma^S_n$ are the ex-ante net gains from matching for the buyer and the seller, respectively. $\Gamma^B$ is constant in $n$ (and $z$) because of ex-ante buyer indifference (equation (3)). $\Gamma^S_n$ depends on the seller’s size: the seller extracts the total gain in joint surplus ($W_{n+1} - W_n > 0$), net of the value $x_{n+1}$ that was promised to the new consumer.

Therefore, part (a) of Proposition 3 says that the equilibrium marginal net gain in joint surplus from each new match (i.e. $W_{n+1} - W_n - U^B$) is a convex combination of the ex-ante net match gains that accrue to the new customer and her seller. Part (b) states that the matching elasticity parameter $\gamma$ governs how the surplus is shared ex-post between the seller and the new customer. The customer’s ex-post net gains are given by:

\[
x_{n+1} - U^B = \gamma \left( W_{n+1} - W_n - U^B \right)
\]

showing that a fraction $\gamma$ of the total gains in joint surplus are absorbed by the new incoming buyer. Interestingly, the ex-post gains for the seller must incorporate rents shared with the new buyer, as well as all those shared with the pre-existing buyers:

\[
\begin{align*}
V^S_{n+1} - V^S_n &= (1 - \gamma) \left( W_{n+1} - W_n - U^B \right) + n \left( x_n - x_{n+1} \right) \\
&\quad \text{[A] Surplus extracted directly out of new customer} \\
&\quad \text{[B] Surplus transferred between seller and pre-existing customers}
\end{align*}
\]

In words, after a $n \to (n+1)$ transition, the seller absorbs a share $(1 - \gamma)$ of the total net gain in joint surplus from the new customer (term [A]). In addition, some surplus is transferred between the seller and the $n$ pre-existing customers (term [B]).

For example, when buyer valuation is decreasing in $n$ (i.e. $x_n > x_{n+1}$), term [B] is a positive transfer from all $n$ pre-existing customers to their seller. Figure 2 shows, in this case, how net gains for buyers and sellers change with size (from both ex-ante and ex-post

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25 For the remainder of this section, we suppress state dependence to alleviate notation.
perspectives). We see in the right-most panel that, as the seller grows, she increasingly prefers to extract rents from the current customer base (term \[B\] increases), and is less concerned with extracting surplus from the new consumer (term \[A\] decreases).

Finally, we describe the relationship between promises \((x_n)\) and sizes \((n)\) in equilibrium. Figure 3 shows a numerical example in which promised utilities are strictly decreasing with size. This will be the case in our estimated model. The reason for the relation is that the seller needs to raise resources from future customers quickly in order to overcome the initial market penetration cost, \(\kappa\). At the same time, she must entice customers to remain matched. Thus, she lowers the promise as more customers join, but always so that \(x_n > U^B\), \(\forall n\). As a result, market tightness is higher for smaller firms, who experience faster growth on average. On the other hand, when the costs to market penetration are sufficiently low, the need to raise resources from the future is weaker. In this case, the profile of continuation values increases, and price will rise as the seller grows (Figure B.2 in Appendix B). In sum, the model can generate different price-size correlations, depending on parameters.

### 3.2 Discussion of the Model’s Main Assumptions

Our model is somewhat stylized, particularly on the contractual environment. Here, we comment on the three most relevant assumptions:

---

Figure 2: Ex-ante and ex-post gains for the new buyer and the seller (left and middle panels), and decomposition of seller gains, across seller size \(n\) (right panel), for a numerical example. The red lines are \(\Gamma^B\) and \(\Gamma_n^S\). The black lines are \((x_{n+1} - U^B)\) and \((W_{n+1} - W_n - x_{n+1})\). The right panel is the decomposition in equation (24).

Figure 3: Change in joint surplus, net customer ex-post gains, market tightness, and firm growth, as a function of size, for the case with constant marginal cost (i.e. \(C(n) \propto n\)). Firm growth (equation (14)) has been decomposed between the rate of customer attraction (solid line) and that of customer attrition (dashed line). The intersection of these two lines marks the stationary size.
Endogenous Separations  We have assumed that customers cannot bypass the costly inactive state when they separate (either voluntarily or due to a shock) from their seller. Allowing for endogenous seller-to-seller transitions would incorporate an additional dimension into the firm’s pricing decisions. Besides the dynamic rent-extraction trade-off between incoming customers and the current base, the firm would now have to solve an attraction-attrition trade-off: a more ex-post profitable contract for inactive buyers may enhance the chance of a customer match, but also increase the likelihood of a voluntary separation. We propose how to endogenize this margin in Appendix D.1, and discuss the technical challenges it presents.

Price Discrimination  Secondly, we have assumed that sellers cannot price discriminate across customers of different tenure. While this assumption is realistic for most major sectors of the economy, especially those in which sellers face a large number of potential buyers (such as retail, our application in Section 4.1), it may not be apt for certain others, for instance industries in which personalized buyer-seller relationships may explicitly (newspapers, cell phone and Internet services, commercial banks, etc). Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) propose a model for such type of relationships, whereby sellers first attract the buyer by offering her a price discount below her valuation of the good, and charge maximum valuation thereafter. Though the focus of our paper is altogether different, it is still worth emphasizing that our pricing policy does not collapse to this pricing strategy when we allow for discrimination. Moreover, allowing for discrimination in our environment not only preserves the block-recursivity property, which is key for tractability, but it also preserves firm dynamics and price dispersion. Importantly, however, assuming discriminatory contracting gives rise to a new feature: equilibrium multiplicity in the form of price indeterminacy. We explain these results in detail in Appendix D.2.

Commitment  The third main contractual assumption is that of perfect commitment on the seller’s side. Intuitively, long-term contracts are a stand-in for a reputational concern on the side of the firm. By promising to deliver a utility level, the seller can balance the price with the continuation value to lure customers into remaining matched. In turn, customers understand that the firm will not price gouge ex-post, and they remain loyal to their seller in order to avoid going through the costly inactive state. If we were to dispense of the assumption, we would lose block recursivity and, thereby, the attractive analytical features of the equilibrium. The reason for this is that, due to a time-inconsistency problem, firms could engage in various forms of pricing strategies, all of which could be sustained under “implicit contracts”, paired with trigger strategies on the buyer side (e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson (2011)). These type of contracts might exhibit history-dependence, which in our framework would break the recursive structure. Further, sellers would need to keep track of the buyer distribution, for ex-ante revenue equalization would no longer hold. For these reasons, seller’s commitment is a key aspect for our set-up.
4 Quantitative Analysis

In this section, we outline the estimation exercise, and study how customer accumulation affects the micro- and macro-economic impact of aggregate shocks on markups.

4.1 Data

We use micro-pricing data on the U.S. retail sector. Although the model is general, we view the retail sector as fitting well with its basic features. In this interpretation of the theory, sellers are stores, and buyers are private consumers. We use data of unique granularity which allows us to focus on narrowly-defined (physically) homogenous products sold by sellers of different sizes within the same market, in accord with the environment of the model. The types of goods in the data are non-durable consumption products that, as in the model, are likely to engage customers and sellers into repeated purchases. The fact that retail stores face a potentially large number of customers implies that the customer anonymity assumption likely provides a good approximation for the bulk of the observed store transactions. Finally, under this framing of the model, we interpret the buyer’s search cost as a proxy for the transport, information, and/or utility costs associated to finding and/or switching away from trusted suppliers.

We use micro-level data from the Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) scanner data set (2001-2007). We use weekly average prices for products sold over 5,000 U.S. retail (drug and grocery) stores on 50 different (geographic) markets defined at the MSA level. Products are identified by their Universal Product Code (UPC). The details of data selection and variable construction can be found in Appendix A. To capture the degree to which the same good is sold at different prices by different stores, we follow the literature (e.g. Kaplan et al. (2018)) and focus on relative prices. The relative price of good \( u \) in store \( s \) of market \( m \) and week \( t \) is the log-deviation from the average price of such good across stores:

\[
\hat{p}_{ums,t} = \log P_{ums,t} - \frac{1}{N_{um,t}} \sum_{s=1}^{N_{um,t}} \log P_{ums,t} \tag{25}
\]

where \( N_{um,t} \) is the number of stores selling the good in that market and week. To measure price dispersion in the data we take the average of the standard deviation of \( \hat{p}_{ums,t} \) across products, stores, markets, and time. In our selected sub-sample, dispersion is high (10.55%), in line with previous studies (e.g. Kaplan and Menzio (2015)).

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26 The data are available for request at www.iriworldwide.com/en-US/solutions/Academic-Data-Set. For documentation, see Bronnenberg et al. (2008). Recent studies in economics using the IRI data include Álvarez et al. (2014), Gagnon and López-Salido (2014), and Coibion et al. (2015).

27 The UPC is an array of numerical digits that is uniquely assigned to a given item. The description of products is very detailed, including information about the brand, flavor, and several packaging attributes.
4.2 Estimation

To estimate the model, the first step is to parametrize the cost function of firms and establish the structure of the exogenous shocks. For the former, we choose:

$$ C(n; z, \varphi) = \tilde{c}(z, \varphi) \cdot n^\psi $$

(26)

where $\tilde{c}(z, \varphi) > 0$ is a size-invariant scale parameter, and $\psi \geq 1$ is a curvature parameter controlling for the degree of returns to scale.\(^{28}\) When marginal costs are increasing in size ($\psi > 1$), there is a natural upper bound on seller size for each state, given by $n^*(z, \varphi) \equiv (\psi \tilde{c}(z, \varphi)/v)^{1/\psi}$, beyond which the static flow surplus $\pi_n(z, \varphi) \equiv nv - C(n; z, \varphi)$ is strictly decreasing and the seller does not want to grow further. The scale parameter changes across sellers and aggregate states, with $\tilde{c}(z, \varphi) = we^{z+\varphi}$, where $w > 0$ controls the optimal scale. This specification of shocks is isomorphic to multiplicatively-related idiosyncratic and aggregate TFP shocks in the production function, standard in the literature (e.g. Kaas and Kircher (2015)).

Finally, we must parametrize the states. The size grid is $N \equiv \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, for some upper bound $n < +\infty$ that is large enough.\(^{29}\) Then, we show:

**Proposition 4 (Stability)** Given an equilibrium allocation, the dynamical system represented by the flow equations (19)-(20)-(21) over the grid $(n, z) \in N \times Z$ is stable, and converges to an invariant distribution for each aggregate state $\varphi \in \Phi$. The invariant distribution can be analytically characterized.

For the proof, see Appendix C.4. Further, we must specify the structure of the exogenous shocks, $(z, \varphi)$. In principle, we should estimate $k_s(k_s - 1)$ transition rates for each $s \in \{z, \varphi\}$, a potentially large number. To reduce dimensionality, in practice we assume that the shocks follow continuous-time analogues of AR(1) processes (or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes), in logs. This reduces the estimation to only two parameters per shock: a persistence $\rho$, and a volatility $\sigma$. For details, see Appendix E.1.

**Calibration Strategy**

We seek to match aggregate moments related to store dynamics in the U.S. retail sector as well as average moments across all years of our sample of micro-pricing data.

The model is parsimonious, with 11 free parameters to be identified. Of these, 9 are deep parameters: $(v, r, \delta_f, \delta_c, w, \psi, \kappa, \gamma, c)$, corresponding to the value of consumption, the time discount rate, the separation rates of sellers and consumers, the scale and curvature parameters of the operating cost function, the entry cost for new sellers, the matching elasticity,

\(^{28}\)As seen in Section 3, curvature in the cost function is not necessary for the existence of price dispersion in the model. However, the parameter $\psi$ will help us pin down the size dependence in prices.

\(^{29}\)In particular, this upper bound is never binding in the sense that $\bar{n} > n^*(z, \varphi)$. In our estimation, we assume $\bar{n} = 50$. 

26
and the search cost for inactive buyers, respectively. In addition, we must set values for the persistence and dispersion parameters of the exogenous productivity state process: \((\rho_z, \sigma_z)\). We assume that \(z\) can take up to \(k_z = 25\) different values, and normalize its mean to unity. We do not estimate the aggregate shocks \(\varphi\) because the spirit of our calibration exercise is to estimate an economy in its long-run equilibrium. These will be re-introduced in Section 5, when we study the response of markups to aggregate supply and demand shocks.

**External identification** The parameters \((v, r, \delta_c)\) are calibrated outside the model. The value of consumption is normalized to \(v = 1\), so that the consumption good serves as the numeraire of the economy. The discount rate is set to \(r = 0.05\), corresponding to a discount factor of approximately 95% annually. The exogenous separation probability is set to match a 0.044% weekly customer turnover rate (corresponding to \(\delta_c \approx 0.2041\) at our yearly frequency), which implies that customer relationships last a bit more than 4 and a half years on average. We borrow this value from Paciello et al. (2017), who estimated it on the same IRI data we use here. The number falls within the range of values reported by Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) (between 10% and 25% annually).

**Internal identification** Because of the high non-linearity of the model, identifying each of the remaining parameters separately is unfeasible. However, we can provide some intuition for how each one is informative about specific moments. We estimate the parameters jointly by matching a combination of aggregate and seller-level moments via simulated method of moments (SMM). To implement this procedure, we use an algorithm that randomly searches in the parameter space, and then employs an unweighted minimum-distance criterion function that compares empirical moments to model-implied moments from both the stationary solution as well as simulated data.

For the stationary solution, we solve a fixed-point algorithm that uses value function iteration on \(W\) and a bisection procedure to solve for the value of inactivity, \(U^B\). Appendix E.2 outlines the details of this method. To obtain moments from simulated data, we generate histories for many distinct sellers over \(T = 100\) years of data which we discretize with time steps of equidistant length \(\Delta = 0.01\) each. All sellers are drawn from the stationary distribution at time \(t = 0\) and evolve endogenously through simulated Markov chains that replicate the dynamics described in Section 2.5. We drop the first half of the time series when computing average simulated moments to make sure we draw from the stationary distribution. For the entrants’ productivity distribution \(\pi_z\), we use the ergodic distribution implied by the calibrated Markov chain for \(z\).

The set of targeted moments can be grouped into two broad categories: (i) aggregate moments, and (ii) store-level moments related to the distribution of sales and prices. At the aggregate level, we target an average annual entry rate of 8.9%, which we compute for our

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30 Further, in Appendix F.3 we show that, for a given \(U^B\), \(W\) has a unique fixed point, and therefore the VFI method is convergent.
IRI sample as the average across years 2001-2007 of the ratio of stores aged 52 weeks or less to the total number of existing stores within that year. We define the entry rate in the model as the ratio of actual entrants to the total mass of incumbents. The exit rate is the measure of sellers who either die or lose their last remaining customer. By equation (21), this means:

$$\text{EntryRate} = \frac{S_0}{\sum_{n,z} S_n(z)} \sum_{z_0 \in Z} \pi_z(z_0) \eta_1(z_0); \quad \text{ExitRate} = \delta_f + \delta_c \frac{\sum_z S_1(z)}{\sum_{n,z} S_n(z)}$$

These formulas hold in and out of steady state, but are equal to each other in the absence of $\varphi$-shocks, so the entry rate in the data helps us identify the exogenous exit rate $\delta_f$ in the model. At the aggregate level, we also target the cross-sectional average markup. Because measuring markups in the data usually requires a stand on market structure and the demand curve faced by firms, in the literature estimates vary substantially depending on the empirical methodology used, the industry of consideration, and the overall sample. Using firm-level data, typical estimates range from about 10% to as much as 50% or more. We choose to target a markup of 39%, a number that we impute from the average ratio over our sample period (2001-2007) of gross margins to sales in the retail sector. To be consistent with the empirical target, in the model we compute measured markups as the sales-weighted average of the ratio of price to marginal cost:

$$\bar{m} = \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{z} m_n(z); \quad \text{with } m_n(z) = s_n(z) \frac{p_n(z)}{mc_n(z)}$$

where $s_n(z) = \frac{np_n(z)}{\sum_{n,z} np_n(z)}$ is the sales share of type $(n,z)$ firms, and $mc_n(z) = C(n;z) - C(n-1;z)$ is the marginal cost of this type of firms. Though many parameters affect the average markup, $\gamma$ is the most relevant one, as it governs how the gains from trade are shared between the customers and their seller.

At the store level, we target moments from the distribution of prices and sales that we obtain from our IRI sample. The cost parameters $(\psi, w)$ determine firm profitability across sizes, so they play an important role in determining the degree by which firms of similar productivity choose to set different prices for the same product. We choose to target two moments that relate to this dimension of heterogeneity. First, we target price dispersion (10.55% in the data). Second, we target the inter-decile range in the distribution of relative prices between the tenth percentile and the median relative price, equal to 1.1215 (see Table 31). For example, DeLoecker and Warzynski (2012) find that median markups range from 10% to 28% for Slovenia, depending on the specification, while DeLoecker et al. (2016) find even more variation, from 15% up to 43%, using similar methods for India. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) report an average markup of 37% for the Euro area, and of 32% for the U.S. We obtain this number from the latest Annual Retail Trade Report of the U.S. Census Bureau (https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html). The average gross margin is about 28%, implying an average markup of .28/(1 -.28) ≈ .39. For comparison, Hottman (2017) estimates average markups in the U.S. retail sector and finds slightly lower numbers, in the range 29-33%.

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A.2 in the Appendix). We target this measure of left-tail dispersion because the size distribution is right-skewed, and thus matching the lower end of the distribution will ensure that we capture the pricing behavior of the bulk of population of sellers.

Next, we need to discipline the parameters of the exogenous productivity process, \( z \). We target the yearly autocorrelation in normalized store-level sales (pinning down the persistence \( \rho_z \)), and the dispersion in the distribution of normalized sales (pinning down the volatility \( \sigma_z \)). Finally, we need to calibrate the search cost for buyers, \( c \), and the market penetration cost for sellers, \( \kappa \). As we discussed in Section 3, these parameters are important to pin down the dependence between seller size and seller price, which determines two key aspects of firm dynamics: (i) the growth rate of sellers across sizes; and (ii) the stationary size. For the former, we target the correlation between store product-level sales growth rates and the relative price of those products. For the latter, we target the stationary size of sellers in the data, so that the average size in the model and the data are comparable. In the model, we measure the average size of firms as the mean number of units sold per firm. Since each customer consumes only one unit, the average size is (see e.g. Luttmer (2006)):

\[
L = \left( \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} \frac{1}{n} L_n(z) \right)^{-1}; \quad \text{with} \quad L_n(z) = \frac{nS_n(z)}{\sum_{n,z} nS_n(z)}
\]  

where \( L_n(z) \) is the fraction of active buyers that are customers of sellers of type \((n, z)\). In our sample, the average number of units sold of each product within a store is 12.4 in volume-equivalent terms,\(^{33}\) so we target this number in the estimation.

**Estimation Results**

Table 1 presents the full set of calibrated parameters. Table 2 shows the result of the calibration exercise in terms of moment-matching. The fit is reasonably good. We are able to match both aggregate entry rates and average markups accurately, as well as the average and the left-tail dispersion in relative prices. The model slightly under-predicts dispersion in normalized sales, probably as the result of outliers in the data. On the other hand, the correlation between sales growth and relative prices in the model is slightly strong relative to its empirical counterpart. This likely reflects factors attenuating the relationship between prices and sales that are not captured by the model.\(^{34}\)

Figure 4 plots the joint surplus, pricing policy function, measured markups, and promised utility, in the space of seller sizes \((n)\) and productivities \((z)\), for the calibrated set of parameter values. We find that matches with more customers and higher productivity levels (i.e. lower values for \( z \)) earn a larger surplus. Moreover, we find that the pricing policy is increasing in

\(^{33}\) The IRI sample provides a conversion system whereby units of different product categories can be made comparable. We use this standardization for this calculation.

\(^{34}\) To get a visual idea of identification, Figure B.4 in the Appendix plots each calibrated moment against the distribution across different model simulation runs that results from our parameter-search algorithm. We see that, with a few exceptions, the calibrated moment is close to the median of this distribution.
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*Calibrated externally*

<table>
<thead>
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<td>Cost curvature</td>
<td>Standard deviation of relative prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w$</td>
<td>0.1510</td>
<td>Cost scale</td>
<td>p50-p10 inter-decile range in relative prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>0.5457</td>
<td>Buyer search cost</td>
<td>Average store size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>1.6214</td>
<td>Firm entry cost</td>
<td>Sales growth and relative price correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_z$</td>
<td>0.0751</td>
<td>Persistence of $z$</td>
<td>Autocorrelation in normalized store sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_z$</td>
<td>0.1034</td>
<td>Volatility of $z$</td>
<td>Dispersion in normalized store sales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimated internally*

**Frequency** Annual

**Table 1:** Full set of calibrated parameters in the baseline estimation. Notes: The parameters $(\rho_z, \sigma_z)$ correspond to the Euler-Maruyama equation (E.1) of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for $z$. See Appendix E.1 for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Aggregate moments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual entry rate</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>IRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average markup (2001-07)</td>
<td>1.388</td>
<td>1.383</td>
<td>U.S. Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Store-level moments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$sd$(Relative prices)</td>
<td>0.1072</td>
<td>0.1055</td>
<td>IRI (Table A.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p50-p10 IDR relative prices</td>
<td>1.1224</td>
<td>1.1215</td>
<td>IRI (Table A.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average store size</td>
<td>10.73</td>
<td>12.44</td>
<td>IRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$corr$(Sales growth, Relative price)</td>
<td>$-0.023$</td>
<td>$-0.007$</td>
<td>IRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ac$(Normalizes sales)</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>IRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$sd$(Normalized sales)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>IRI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:** Targeted moments: model versus data. Notes: Average markup is weighted by sales shares. IDR means inter-decile range. $sd$, $corr$, and $ac$ mean “standard deviation”, “correlation”, and “autocorrelation”, respectively.
the size of the customer base, and decreasing in productivity. Even though marginal costs are higher for larger firms (as $\psi > 1$), measured markups are still increasing in size. In Figure 5 we plot the distribution of normalized sales and that of the seller’s customer base that result from the simulation of the estimated model. The figure demonstrates that our model can generate an invariant size distribution with a fat right-tail in both seller revenues and output that resembles its empirical counterpart (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). We also show (panel (c)) the age distribution, to demonstrate that most small sellers in the economy are young.

Figure 5: Sales, customer, and seller age distributions, for the simulated economy under the calibrated set of parameters. Sales have been normalized by their mean.
Validation

To validate the results of our calibration, we assess the model’s performance on non-targeted moments. We look at two sets of moments. First, we check the model’s performance on other measures of relative price dispersion, namely inter-decile ranges between the first and ninth deciles, and fifth and ninth deciles. The results are in Panel A of Table 3. The model’s predictions regarding these measures are in line with the microdata.

We also look at the model’s ability to generate a quantitatively correct behavior of price changes. For this exercise, in the model we compute micro-price statistics along the stationary solution using the formulas derived in Appendix G. In the data, we define the weekly frequency of price changes within a store and market of interest as the share of goods sold by that store in that week that experience a price change. For the moments of the distribution of price changes, we look at the absolute value of log differences. Finally, we annualize frequencies and rates in the model and the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Distribution of Relative Prices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p90-p10 range</td>
<td>1.1994</td>
<td>1.2504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p90-p50 range</td>
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<td>1.1149</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Distribution of Price Changes</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Average frequency</td>
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<td>0.9609</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median frequency</td>
<td>0.9814</td>
<td>0.9264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average implied duration</td>
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<td>0.7817</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median implied duration</td>
<td>0.2503</td>
<td>0.3568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average absolute change</td>
<td>0.0305</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median absolute change</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
<td>0.0197</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Dev. absolute change</td>
<td>0.0505</td>
<td>0.1415</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Non-targeted moments: model vs. data. Notes: Data moments are taken from our IRI sample. See Appendix G for the calculation and aggregation of firm-level price statistics in the model.

Panel B in Table 3 reports the simulated moments and their empirical counterparts. The calibrated model does a good job in predicting the empirical frequency of price changes, even though these moments were not targeted. The model predicts relatively well the median price duration, though the average duration is not accurately predicted because the distribution

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35 We focus only on regular price changes, which we define (following Coibion et al. (2015)) as changes in prices that are larger than 1% or $0.01 in absolute value for products that are neither entering nor coming out of promotion, and whose initial price is less than, or equal to, $5. For non-promotional goods with initial prices higher than $5, this threshold 0.5%. These criteria eliminate small price changes that may be due to rounding or reporting errors. Promotional goods are flagged by the IRI directly. In order to filter out temporary price reductions that may not have been flagged, we also exclude changes that return to their initial level within 3 weeks after the initial change.
of price durations in the model is not sufficiently skewed. The model also predicts several moments of the distribution of expected price changes, especially the average price change and the median. We can explain about one third of the dispersion in the size of price changes, even though the model was not calibrated for this purpose. Figure B.3 in Appendix B shows how these measures of price changes vary across firm size, with smaller firms experiencing more frequent and larger price changes.

5 The Response to Aggregate Shocks

In this section, we analyze the impact of aggregate supply and demand shocks at both the macroeconomic level as well as in the cross-section of firms using the estimated model. We seek to understand how sellers’ incentives to accumulate customers can generate amplification and persistence through both level and distributional effects, generate incomplete pass-through on prices, and imply procyclicality in markups.

Because the equilibrium is block-recursive, aggregate dynamics in the model are internalized by agents, so the shocks and their aftermath are fully anticipated. This makes the shocks akin to business cycles fluctuations.

Supply Shocks

Starting from the stationary equilibrium of the calibrated economy, we study the response to a temporary negative 1% supply shock to the marginal cost. The aggregate state follows a mean-reverting process in logs (details in Appendix E.1). The shock hits at some time \( t_0 \), and the process continues without further shocks for \( t > t_0 \). Figure 6 presents the results. The response of the economy to the aggregate shock combines both level and compositional effects. Let us describe each of these in detail.

First, due to an increase in the cost of serving each customer (panel (a)), the flow payoff in joint surplus falls on impact (panel (b)). To mitigate the effects on their own profits, sellers lower the continuation utility that they promise to deliver to each customer going forward (panel (c)). Thus, active buyers are hit harder by the shock than sellers. As a result, firms attract less inactive buyers, for ex-ante values from matching have lowered. The average tightness in the market falls (panel (d)), and with it firm growth. Interestingly, while prices increase in response to the shock, the pass-through is incomplete (panel (e)). The increase in prices is due to the fact that, when faced with an adverse shock to their costs, sellers choose to re-balance their contracts by front-loading payments from their buyers. They implement this by choosing to exploit their customers more today (through a higher price). Yet, to honor

---

36 To transform frequency \( f \) to duration \( d \), we use \( d = \frac{1}{-\log(1-f)} \). See details in Appendix G. For medians, we apply the formula directly on the median frequency to obtain the median duration. For means, we first use the formula to compute the implied duration for each store and price, and then take the mean.

37 We call procyclicality the positive comovement between the response of the variable in question and the measure of active buyers (which equals aggregate output because each buyer consumes one unit).
Figure 6: Impulse responses of selected variables to a negative and temporary 1% shock to aggregate productivity (i.e., an increase in the marginal cost).

Notes: All responses expressed in %-deviations from steady-state. The shock hits at date $t_0 = 0$. The shock is implemented with $k_\phi = 25$ grid nodes, and paths are smoothed out with cubic splines. Panel (a) depicts the path of the exogenous state. Panels (b) to (f) depict cross-sectional averages using the simulated distribution of firms over idiosyncratic states. That is, for any policy or value function $f(n, z)$, we plot the %-deviation of $\sum_{n, z} f(n, z) m_t(n, z)$, where $m_t(n, z)$ is the count of firms of type $(n, z)$ at time $t$, and $N_t \equiv \sum_{n, z} m_t(n, z)$ is the total count of incumbent firms. The average number of customers per firm in panel (h) is computed using equation (29). Panels (i) and (j) are computed using equations (27). Panel (l) is computed using equation (28).
their promises, they must choose an increasing path of buyer utilities in the transition. As
the shock is smoothed out inter-temporally via these two contracting instruments, the price
response is muted. In the calibrated economy, in particular, the price response is about 12%
the size of the shock. Note, moreover, that this dynamic re-balancing of payments increases
flow sales in spite of the decrease in the extensive margin of demand, though this increase is
only temporary (panel (f), solid line). Flow profits decrease, in contrast, as the rise in sales
is overwhelmed by the increase in costs (panel (f), dashed line).

Since prices react less than one-for-one, the average measured markup (panel (l), solid
line) falls with output, i.e. it is procyclical. Looking at the response by seller size, we find that
smaller sellers (dashed line) respond stronger on impact, while the largest sellers’ response
(dotted line) is weaker than the average. Similar features have been documented in the data.
For instance, Hong (2017) has found differential responses of markups across firm sizes, with
smaller firms displaying more elastic responses to output shocks. In the model, this occurs
because smaller sellers experience more frequent and larger price changes per unit of time,

To explain the behavior of measured markups in the transition and in the cross section, we
must first understand the distributional consequences of the shock. First, the rate of inactive
buyers gradually increases (panel (g)), so firms start to shrink on average (panel (h)). These
trends continue for a few periods, until they are eventually reversed by the continued increase
in promised utilities and seller growth rates. In the first phase of the transition, therefore,
the size distribution is gradually shifting to the left. Because measured markups and size
are positively correlated in the calibrated economy, the increase in the relative measure of
small firms means that the contribution of low-markup firms to the aggregate markup is now
relatively more important. Therefore, the persistence of the shock on markups is higher for
smaller sellers, as reflected in the fact that markups take longer to mean-revert for these type
of sellers relative to larger ones.38

To recap, sellers smooth out the effects of the adverse shock inter-temporally by raising
prices imperfectly and depressing promised utilities. For further illustration of this result,
Figure 7 shows how the responses discussed above vary with the average duration of customer
relationships, as measured by $\delta_c$. In particular, we compare the baseline economy (solid),
with an economy in which the duration of customer relationships is one-third shorter (dashed)
and the remaining parameters remain fixed at their original calibrated values. In line with
our intuition, Figure 7 shows that the response is dampened when customer relationships
are shorter (that is, when $\delta_c$ is higher). This is because, when sellers expect their customers

38 Let us also explain the behavior of the entry and exit rates. First, since the risk of exiting has become
higher for smaller firms, the aggregate exit rate goes up (panel (i)). Interestingly, the entry rate goes up as
well (panel (j)), so much so that the number of inactive sellers decreases (panel (k)). Indeed, in the entry
market the tightness has increased (unlike other markets). This is because, in order to enter into the economy,
potential sellers must raise resources to pay for the fixed market penetration cost, $\kappa$. Since inactive buyers’
ex-ante match value has worsen, the seller must now raise the initial promised compensation enough in order
to guarantee that the costs of entry are still being recouped in expectation.
to remain captive for a shorter time, sellers care more about their immediate profits, so promised utility needs to decrease less on impact (panel (a)) as these captive buyers are not expected to remain matched for long. Accordingly, the seller can charge higher prices on impact (panel (c)), thereby alleviating the adverse effects of the shock on her own valuation (panel (b)). The effects of the shock on prices and continuation utilities become naturally less persistent. Finally, since the price pass-through is less incomplete as $\delta_c$ increases, the absolute response of the average markup (panel (d)) is weaker. In the limit as $\delta_c$ gets very large, markups would be acyclical to marginal cost shocks, as prices would respond one-for-one and promised utilities would remain unaffected by the shock.

**Demand Shocks**

Recent research has emphasized the relevance that consumer shopping behavior may have on macroeconomic dynamics (e.g. Bai et al. (2017), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015), Paciello et al. (2017)). In these papers, a shock in demand can have a strong impact on search incentives, and lead to persistent price responses. In this section, we argue that the underlying size heterogeneity and the forces of firm entry of our model can provide additional insights into the response of markups to aggregate demand shocks.

We consider a shock to the instantaneous utility $v$. We implement a 1% negative shock to $v$ at time $t_0$, and let the process mean-revert without any further shocks for all $t > t_0$. We choose an autocorrelation for the $\varphi$ process implying a half life of about three years, following Paciello et al. (2017) and in line with estimates by Bai et al. (2017). Figure 8 presents the results. A negative shock to the utility from consumption leads to a decrease in the number of buyers looking for a seller, since consumption is worth less. Because the buyers’ outside option has relatively improved, firms lower the promised utility in an attempt to smooth the effects of the shock. Once again, the burden of the shock is passed almost entirely on to the customer: the seller’s value decreases only slightly (panel (c), dashed line), and it is the decrease in the value of the buyer (panel (c), solid line) which accounts for the bulk of
Figure 8: Impulse responses of selected variables to a negative and temporary 1% shock to aggregate demand (i.e. a decrease in the utility of consumption \( v \)), expressed in %-deviations from steady-state. Notes: See Figure 6.
the drop in joint surplus (panel (b)). Market tightness falls on impact (panel (d)), leading
to a drop in the matching rate which causes sellers to progressively shrink in size (panel
(h)), and more buyers to remain inactive (panel (g)). In this respect, the demand shock is
akin to a productivity shock (Figure 6), in line with the intuition in Bai et al. (2017). The
compositional effects are similar to those in our previous analysis: a left-ward shift in the
firm size distribution, which accounts for the increase in the exit rate and in the relative
contribution of low-markup firms to the average response. However, the behavior of prices
in response to the demand shock is different than before.

First, the incomplete pass-through that we observed for supply shocks, and which was
due to firms optimally tilting their pricing contract toward more immediate payoffs through
higher prices today, is no longer present here. A shock to the marginal propensity to consume
has a one-for-one impact on the extensive margin of demand because of linearity in consumer
preferences. This means that all the adjustment has to be made along promised utilities,
which respond a lot more to the demand shock compared to the case of supply shocks. Sellers
understand the temporary nature of the shock ex-ante, so in the transition they increase their
promises, and seller growth picks up. As before, the size distribution shifts left in a first phase
of the transition, and returns back to its original position in the long-run. Thus, the level
effects of the demand shock are accompanied by interesting compositional effects.

As a result of the demand shock, the relative attractiveness of small firms improves, as
markups decrease relatively more for these firms (see panel (l)). This induces a short-lived
spike in the entry of small seller, and a further downward pressure on prices. In addition, the
entry of (small) sellers causes a surge in the contribution of low-price firms to the aggregate
price level. At the other end of the distribution, the shock decreases the relative mass of large
sellers, which attenuates the markup response for these type of sellers. Thus, the cyclicality
in the response of measured markups is partly explained by compositional shifts in the firm
distribution, whereby the entry of new firms with low prices amplifies the response of the
economy to aggregate shocks.

Summing up, while prices in the model are procyclical after demand shocks and coun-
tercyclical after supply shocks, markups are always procyclical to both supply and demand
shocks. Markup procyclicality is a feature that standard models of price rigidities, such
as the New Keynesian model, have trouble replicating, particularly conditional on demand
shocks. Yet, recent empirical studies tend to rule against countercyclical markup variation
conditional on either type of shock (e.g. Nekarda and Ramey (2013)). We have proposed a
micro-founded mechanism through which this empirical observation can be rationalized as
the optimal response of firms concerned with building up a stock of demand.

The Margins of Price Adjustment

To conclude, we seek to further understand the main margins along which prices adjust
in response to aggregate shocks. For this, we decompose the price response into the response
of the different price components that we identified in equation (15).
Figure 9: Impulse responses to negative and temporary 1% supply and demand shocks (same as Figures 6-8). Decomposition of the average price response by the price components identified in equation (15). Each component is averaged using the theoretical distribution of sellers across states. The exogenous shock adjustments (last two terms of equation (15)) are not being plotted.

Figure 9 shows the response of each component, for the same supply and demand shocks introduced above. First, we observe that the “baseline” component of price is a more responsive in the case of a demand shock, overwhelming the other components, and ultimately explaining why the overall price response is procyclical after a demand shock. For a supply shock, this effect is attenuated by the contractual mechanism of incomplete pass-through explained above. In both cases, the “growth” component is procyclical, while the “exit” and “separation” components are countercyclical.

In sum, in response to adverse supply shocks, sellers grow more concerned with expanding their base (as they offer large price compensation through this margin to generate high rates of subsequent growth). While this phenomenon is to some also extent present after adverse demand shocks, in that case prices change primarily because the seller’s current buyers depress their valuation for consumption.

6 Conclusion

Empirical evidence suggests that a major source of variation in the performance of businesses stems from heterogeneity in idiosyncratic demand components across firms. Further, price differences are key to explain revenue differences for firms that operate within the same product markets and under similar productivity levels. These observations may alter our understanding of how markups behave at the aggregate level. We have presented a dynamic search model of demand accumulation through pricing with aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and a relevant scope for firm dynamics in order to study the connection between

\[^{39}\text{For the former, the reason is that, even though sellers respond to both types of shocks by cutting promised utilities, smaller sellers make relatively bigger cuts as demand is more elastic for them. Thus, the relative value of an additional customer (the object } x_{n+1} - x_n \text{ goes up after a negative shock, so sellers overcompensate customers in their price level for the eventuality of growing.}\]

39
customer capital at the microeconomic level and the macroeconomic dynamics of prices. In the model, sellers of different sizes strategically use menus of prices and continuation promises in order to trade off two conflicting concerns: attracting new customers to increase future market share, and extracting surplus from incumbent customers to increase current profits. The model exhibits cross-sectional price dispersion, and offers a micro-founded interpretation for sluggish firm- and aggregate- dynamics.

We have analyzed a number of predictions on both pricing and firm dynamics dimensions. Using product-level data from the U.S. retail sector, we have estimated the model and conducted experiments on the response of the economy to aggregate shocks to productivity and demand. We have found both level and compositional effects. In response to adverse and mean-reverting aggregate shocks, sellers inter-temporally smooth out the effects of the shock on prices by transferring the burden onto their future buyers, giving rise to an incomplete price response and markup procyclicality. Moreover, we have also shown that smaller sellers experience stronger and more persistent responses.

Overall, these results suggest that incorporating micro-founded pricing behavior into quantitative macro models can help us understand certain patterns of macroeconomic dynamics and firm heterogeneity. Further investigating how customer markets may help explain these and other dimensions remains an exciting avenue for future work.
References


APPENDIX

A Data Description

The IRI scanner dataset spans a period of 12 years (from the first week of January 2001 to the last week of December 2012), and contains revenue and quantity information for over 5,000 retail (drug and grocery) stores over 50 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) in the U.S. The data are automatically generated by retailers through their point-of-sale systems. Products, at the UPC level, are grouped into broad categories. We narrow our attention to two large geographical markets (New York and Los Angeles) in the period 2001-2007, and consider 15 product categories. We back out the weekly average price ($P$) from revenues ($R$) and quantities ($Q$):

$$P_{u,sm,t} = \frac{R_{u,sm,t}}{Q_{u,sm,t}}$$

for each UPC $u$ within week $t$, in store $s$ and (geographic) market $m$. Throughout, we restrict our sample to products that are commonly available across stores and not only sold in specific establishments. Given the overall number of stores in our sample, we drop goods sold in less than 10 stores on any week×market. To eliminate outliers, we drop stores with non-positive sales, transactions with prices above $100 (accounting for the top .02\% of the price distribution in the full sample), and cases with multiple observations at the store×market×week×UPC level, which we deem as mis-reported transactions. Finally, in the absence of a theory of price discounts, we focus only on regular prices by filtering out of the sample products on sale. A convenient feature of the data is that products are flagged whenever they go on promotion, which means that we need not employ a filtering algorithm as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) but we can rather exclude flagged products directly.41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Sub-Sample</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Number of product categories</td>
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<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of chains</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of stores</td>
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<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of UPCs</td>
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<td>Stores per chain (average)</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>Stores per product (average)</td>
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<td>Products per store (average)</td>
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<td>Average price (USD)</td>
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<td>15.73%</td>
<td>10.55%</td>
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<td>Total sales (Billion USD)</td>
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<td>NY, LA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>89,112,170</td>
<td>59,813,217</td>
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</table>

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics before and after sample selection. Source: IRI data.

40 The categories are: Beer, Blades, Carbonated Beverages, Cigarettes, Coffee, Cold Cereal, Deodorant, Diapers, Frozen Pizza, Frozen Dinners, Household Cleaners, Hotdogs, Laundry Detergent, Margarine and Butter, and Mayonnaise.

41 A “promotion” is defined by the IRI as a temporary price reduction of 5% or greater. Sales are quite unresponsive to the business cycle, as documented by Coibion et al. (2015) for the IRI data, and therefore excluding should not change our life-cycle results significantly.
Table A.1 shows some descriptive statistics of our data before and after applying these restrictions. Price dispersion is measured as the average standard deviation of $\hat{p}_{usm,t}$ (equation (25)) across products, stores, markets, and time. In our full sample, dispersion at the barcode level is high (15.73%), in line with previous studies using similar micro pricing data from different sources (e.g. Kaplan and Menzio (2015)). The restricted sample has a lower dispersion (10.55%), as a result of having eliminated price outliers and uncommon goods. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of relative prices in our sample, alongside that of normalized sales (the ratio of store-level sales to its mean) and store sales growth rates. Table A.2 presents summary statistics for these distributions. We see that the store size distribution has a fat right tail, which accounts for the high dispersion in normalized sales.

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>.9087</td>
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<td>25th</td>
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<td>75th</td>
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<td>90th</td>
<td>.1097</td>
<td>1.7029</td>
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<tr>
<td>99th</td>
<td>.2809</td>
<td>2.3819</td>
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Dispersion

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<td>p90-p10 range</td>
<td>1.2504</td>
<td>3.6163</td>
<td>1.1661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p90-p50 range</td>
<td>1.1149</td>
<td>1.8740</td>
<td>1.0798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p50-p10 range</td>
<td>1.1215</td>
<td>1.9297</td>
<td>1.0799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.2: Distribution of relative prices, normalized store sales (i.e. the ratio of total dollar sales within the store to average sales across products sold in the store), and annualized sales growth rates, across the whole 2001-2007 sample. Source: IRI weekly data.

Figure A.1: Distribution of normalized store sales (top), store sales growth rates (middle), and relative prices at the UPC level (bottom) in our final sample. Source: IRI weekly data.


B Additional Figures

Figure B.1: Seller transitional dynamics for a typical incumbent (right-hand side block) and for entrants (left-hand side block), where $\phi$ is fixed for expositional ease. Labels on arrows indicate flow rates.

Figure B.2: Same as Figure 3, but with a lower value for $\kappa$. 

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Figure B.3: Hazard rate, frequency, duration, expected price change, and price change dispersion, as a function of size \((n)\), in the calibrated economy.

Figure B.4: Histograms of calibrated moments across different simulated economies in the parameter-search SMM algorithm. The dashed vertical line marks the calibrated value. The solid vertical line is the median of the distribution.
C Omitted Proofs

C.1 Proof of Proposition 1: Joint Surplus Problem

Proof. Denote by \( \varpi = \{ \overline{p}, \mathbf{x}(n'; s') \} \) a generic policy of the typical seller in state \((n; z, \varphi)\), where \( \overline{p} \) is the price level,

\[
\mathbf{x}'(n'; s') = \left\{ \mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi), \mathbf{f}'(n - 1; z, \varphi), \left\{ \mathbf{f}'(n; z', \varphi) : z' \in Z \right\}, \left\{ \mathbf{f}'(n; z, \varphi') : \varphi' \in \Phi \right\} \right\}
\]

is the set of promised utilities, and \( \mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi) \) and \( \mathbf{f}'(n - 1; z, \varphi) \) are the upsizing and downsizing choices, respectively. Recall that \( \mathbf{f}'(n; z, \varphi) = x \) by stationarity.

The value of the seller in equilibrium, \( V^S(n, x; z, \varphi) \), can be written as the maximand on the right-hand side of (6), evaluated at \( \varpi \). That is:

\[
V^S(n, x; z, \varphi) = \max_{\varpi \in \Omega} \overline{V}^S(n, z, \varphi | \varpi) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad x \leq V^B(n, \varpi; z, \varphi)
\]

where \( \overline{V}^S(n, z, \varphi | \varpi) \) is given by:\(^{42}\)

\[
\overline{V}^S(n, z, \varphi | \varpi) = \frac{1}{\rho(n; z, \varphi)} \left[ \frac{1}{\rho(n; z, \varphi)} - C(n; z, \varphi) + \eta \left( \theta(\mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi) \right) V^S(n + 1, \mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi); z, \varphi) \right.
\]

\[
+ n\delta_c V^S(n - 1, \mathbf{f}'(n - 1; z, \varphi); z, \varphi) \right.
\]

\[
+ \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z) V^S(n, \mathbf{f}'(n; z', \varphi); z', \varphi) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi'}(\varphi'|\varphi) V^S(n, \mathbf{f}'(n; z, \varphi'); z, \varphi') \right]
\]

and we have defined \( \rho(n; z, \varphi) \equiv r + \delta_f + n\delta_c + \eta(\theta(\mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi)) \) as the effective discount rate of the firm.

From (C.1.1), it is optimal to offer the highest possible price that is consistent with promise-keeping, for any given policy \( \varpi \). Indeed, the price has no bearing on the agents’ incentives within the search market. Therefore, the PK constraint must bind with equality, and we can solve for the price \( \overline{p} \) such that \( x = V^B(n, \varpi; z, \varphi) \) using equation (5):

\[
p^{PK} : \mathbf{x}'(n'; s') \rightarrow \left\{ v(\varphi) - \rho(n; z, \varphi)x + \delta_f U^B(\varphi) + \eta \left( \theta(\mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi) \right) \mathbf{f}'(n + 1; z, \varphi) \right.
\]

\[
+ \delta_c \left( U^B(\varphi) + (n - 1)\mathbf{f}'(n - 1; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z) \mathbf{f}'(n; z', \varphi) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi'}(\varphi'|\varphi) \mathbf{f}'(n; z, \varphi') \right\}
\]

Using the above notation, we can now substitute the price level \( p^{PK}(\mathbf{x}'(n'; s')) \) from (C.1.2) into the seller’s value (C.1.1). After some straightforward algebra, we obtain:

\[
\widetilde{W}(n, x; z, \varphi | \varpi) = \frac{1}{\rho(n; z, \varphi)} \left[ n \left( v(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_c) U^B(\varphi) \right) \right]
\]

\(^{42}\) Here we are arguing by free-entry that \( V^S(0; 0, \varphi) = 0 \), \( \forall \varphi \in \Phi \), to simplify the expression for \( \overline{V}^S \). Moreover, we use that \( \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z) = \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi'}(\varphi'|\varphi) = 0. \)
\[ -\left( C(n; z, \varphi) + \eta \left( \theta(\pi'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi) \right) \pi'(n + 1; z, \varphi) \right) \\
+ \eta \left( \theta(\pi'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi) \right) W \left( n + 1, \pi'(n + 1; z, \varphi); z, \varphi \right) + n \delta, W \left( n - 1, \pi'(n - 1; z, \varphi); z, \varphi \right) \\
+ \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \lambda_{z}(z'|z) W \left( n, \pi'(n; z, \varphi'; z', \varphi') \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) W \left( n, \pi'(n; z, \varphi''); z, \varphi'' \right) \right] \]  

where we have defined:

\[ \tilde{W}(n, x; z, \varphi) \equiv \tilde{V}_{S}(n; z, \varphi) + nx \]

as the joint surplus under contract $\tilde{\omega}$, and the maximized joint surplus, respectively. Next, note that the right-hand side of equation (C.1.3) does not depend on $x$ nor $p$, and so we can write the joint surplus under a given policy as:

\[ \tilde{W}(n, x; z, \varphi) = \tilde{W}_{n} \left( \pi'(n'; s'); z, \varphi \right) \]

This proves Part 2 of the proposition. Part 1 now readily follows. Since the joint surplus is invariant to the price level by construction, the optimal contract can be found by splitting the program into two separate stages. In the first stage, the seller chooses the vector of continuation values $\pi'(n'; s')$ that maximizes (C.1.3). In the second stage, once the surplus has been maximized, the seller chooses the promise-compatible price level via equation (C.1.2).

Formally, the optimal contract is $\omega^{*} = \{ p^{*}, \pi^{*}(n'; s') \}$, where:

\[ \pi^{*}(n'; s') \equiv \arg \max_{\pi} \tilde{W}_{n}(\pi; z, \varphi) \]  

(C.1.4a)  

\[ p^{*} \equiv p^{PK} \left( \pi^{*}(n'; s') \right) \]  

(C.1.4b)

By expressing the problem of the seller in terms of $\tilde{W}$, we have just shown that the contract that is optimally chosen by the firm, $\omega^{*}$, must maximize the joint surplus. Conversely, for any vector $\pi^{*}(n'; s')$ of continuation values that maximizes the joint surplus, there is a price level, given by $p^{*} = p^{PK} \left( \pi^{*}(n'; s') \right)$, that maximizes the seller’s value subject to the PK constraint.

Therefore, the seller’s problem (equation (6)) and the joint surplus problem (equations (C.1.4a)-(C.1.4b)) are equivalent. □

### C.2 Proof of Proposition 2: Efficiency

**Proof.** Consider a benevolent planner that is constrained by the search frictions of the economy and seeks to maximize aggregate welfare subject to the resource constraints of the economy. The planner can allocate resources freely, so the problem does not feature contracts or prices. Instead, we label each market segment directly by its tightness, $\theta$. To simplify notation, it is understood that time subscripts embody the entire history of aggregate shocks, which is taken to be some arbitrary path $\varphi^{t} = (\varphi_{j} : j \leq t) \subseteq \Phi$.

The planner chooses:

- The tightness in each market segment, $\Theta_{t} \equiv \{ \theta_{n_{t}, z_{t}}(z_{t}) : (n_{t}, z_{t}) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \}$;
• Distributions of inactive and active buyers across markets, $B_t^A \equiv \{B_{n,t}^A(z_t) : (n_t, z_t) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Z}\}$ and $B_t^I \equiv \{B_{n,t}^I(z_t) : (n_t, z_t) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Z}\};$

• A measure of potential entrants $S_{0,t};$

• A distribution of firms across states, $S_t \equiv \{S_{n,t}(z_t) : (n_t, z_t) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Z}\}.$

The planner’s objective is:

$$\max_{\Theta, B_t^A, B_t^I} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-rt} \mathbb{W}_t(\varphi_t) dt \quad (C.2.1)$$

where

$$\mathbb{W}_t(\varphi_t) = -\kappa(\varphi_t)S_{0,t} + \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathcal{Z}} \left[ v(\varphi_t)B_{n,t}^A(z_t) - C(n_t, z_t, \varphi_t)S_{n,t}(z_t) - c(\varphi_t)B_{n,t}^I(z_t) \right]$$

The planner is subject to three sets of constraints. The first one concerns the evolution of the firm distribution:

$$\partial_t S_{0,t} = \delta_f \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathcal{Z}} S_{n,t}(z_t) + \delta_c \sum_{z_t \in \mathcal{Z}} S_{1,t}(z_t) - \sum_{z^* \in \mathcal{Z}} \pi_z(z^*) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z^*))S_{0,t} \quad (C.2.2a)$$

$$\partial_t S_{1,t}(z_t) = \pi_z(z_t) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z_t))S_{0,t} + 2\delta_c S_{2,t}(z_t) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z_t} \lambda_z(z_t|\tilde{z})S_{1,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$- \left( \delta_f + \delta_c + \eta(\theta_{2,t}(z_t)) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z_t} \lambda_z(\tilde{z}|z_t) \right)S_{1,t}(z_t) \quad (C.2.2b)$$

$$\forall n_t \geq 2 : \quad \partial_t S_{n,t}(z_t) = \eta(\theta_{n,t}(z_t))S_{n-1,t}(z_t) + (n_t + 1)\delta_c S_{n+1,t}(z_t) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z_t} \lambda_z(z_t|\tilde{z})S_{n,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$- \left( \delta_f + n_t\delta_c + \eta(\theta_{n+1,t}(z_t)) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z_t} \lambda_z(\tilde{z}|z_t) \right)S_{n,t}(z_t); \quad (C.2.2c)$$

for all $z_t \in \mathcal{Z},$ where $z^*$ denotes the productivity draw upon entry. The second set of constraints describes the distribution of buyers across firms at any given time:

$$\forall (n_t, z_t) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Z} : \quad B_{n,t}^A(z_t) = n_t S_{n,t}(z_t) \quad (C.2.3a)$$

$$\forall (n_t, z_t) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathcal{Z} : \quad B_{n,t}^I(z_t) = \theta_{n,t}(z_t)S_{n-1,t}(z_t) \quad (C.2.3b)$$

$$1 = \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathcal{Z}} \left( B_{n,t}^A(z_t) + B_{n,t}^I(z_t) \right) \quad (C.2.3c)$$

Equation (C.2.3a) states that each customer consumes a single unit; equation (C.2.3b) states that each market segment is in equilibrium, in the sense that the measure of buyers who find a firm in any given market equals the measure of buyers within that market who find a new customer; equation (C.2.3c) says that every buyer in the economy is in either the active or the inactive state.

Finally, the mass of potential entering firms must be non-negative in any aggregate state:

$$S_{0,t} \geq 0 \quad (C.2.4)$$
To solve, first we use constraints (C.2.3a) and (C.2.3b) to rewrite (C.2.3c) as:

$$\sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} n_t S_{n_t,t}(z_t) + \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) + S_{0,t} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{1,t}(z_t) = 1 \quad \text{(C.2.5)}$$

Substituting constraints (C.2.3a) and (C.2.3b) into the objective function:

$$\max_{\Theta_t, S_{0,t}, S_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-rt} \left\{ -\left( \kappa(\varphi_t) + c(\varphi_t) \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{1}(z_t) \right) S_{0,t} + v(\varphi_t) \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} n_t S_{n_t,t}(z_t) \right. $$

$$ - \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} C(n_t; z_t, \varphi_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - c(\varphi_t) \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) $$

$$ + \phi_t \left[ 1 - \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} n_t S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - S_{0,t} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{1,t}(z_t) \right] $$

$$ + \psi_{0,t} \left[ \delta_f \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} S_{n_t,t}(z_t) + \delta_c \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} S_{1,t}(z_t) - \sum_{z^c \in \mathbb{Z}} \pi(z^c) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z^c)) S_{0,t} \right] $$

$$ + \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \left\{ \psi_{1,t}(z_t) \left[ \pi(z_t) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z_t)) S_{0,t} + 2\delta_c S_{2,t}(z_t) + \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} \lambda_z(z_t) S_{1,t}(z) \right] $$

$$ - \left( \delta_f + \delta_c + \eta(\theta_{2,t}(z_t)) + \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} \lambda_z(z_t) S_{1,t}(z) \right) \right\} + \vartheta_t S_{0,t}$$

subject to (C.2.2a), (C.2.2b), (C.2.2c), (C.2.4), and (C.2.5). Conveniently, the variables $B^t_f$ and $B^t_h$ have disappeared from the problem. The state vector now only includes measures of firms: $S_t \equiv [S_{0,t}, S_t]$. The current-value Hamiltonian of the simplified planning problem is:

$$\mathcal{H}_t(\Theta_t; S_t) \equiv \left( \kappa(\varphi_t) + c(\varphi_t) \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{1}(z_t) \right) S_{0,t} + v(\varphi_t) \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} n_t S_{n_t,t}(z_t) $$

$$ - \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} C(n_t; z_t, \varphi_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - c(\varphi_t) \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) $$

$$ + \phi_t \left[ 1 - \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} n_t S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) S_{n_t,t}(z_t) - S_{0,t} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \theta_{1,t}(z_t) \right] $$

$$ + \psi_{0,t} \left[ \delta_f \sum_{n_t=1}^{+\infty} \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} S_{n_t,t}(z_t) + \delta_c \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} S_{1,t}(z_t) - \sum_{z^c \in \mathbb{Z}} \pi(z^c) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z^c)) S_{0,t} \right] $$

$$ + \sum_{z_t \in \mathbb{Z}} \left\{ \psi_{1,t}(z_t) \left[ \pi(z_t) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z_t)) S_{0,t} + 2\delta_c S_{2,t}(z_t) + \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} \lambda_z(z_t) S_{1,t}(z) \right] $$

$$ - \left( \delta_f + \delta_c + \eta(\theta_{2,t}(z_t)) + \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} \lambda_z(z_t) S_{1,t}(z) \right) \right\} + \vartheta_t S_{0,t}$$

where $\psi_{n,t}(z) \geq 0$, $n \geq 1$ (respectively, $\psi_{0,t} \geq 0$) is the co-state variable on the flow equation for $S_{n,t}(z)$ (respectively, $S_{0,t}$); $\phi_t \geq 0$ is the multiplier on (C.2.5); and $\vartheta_t \geq 0$ is the multiplier on the non-negative entry condition, where the corresponding complementary slackness hold. In vector notation, the necessary conditions for optimality are:

$$\nabla_{\Theta_t} \mathcal{H}_t(\Theta_t; S_t) = 0$$

$$\nabla_S \mathcal{H}_t(\Theta_t; S_t) = -\nabla_t \psi_t + r \psi_t$$

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where $\nabla$ denotes the gradient operator, and $\psi_t$ is a stacked vector of co-state variables. These conditions are also sufficient because the Hamiltonian is quasi-concave. Indeed, the objective function is linear in both control and state variables, and because of Assumption 2 establishing concavity of $\eta$, all the constraints are concave in the control and linear in the states.

Regarding the first set of optimality conditions, for given $z_t \in Z$ we have:

$$[\theta_1] : \quad \phi_t + c(\varphi_t) = \left( \psi_{1,t}(z_t) - \psi_{0,t} \right) \pi_z(z_t) \left[ \frac{\partial \eta(\theta)}{\partial \theta} \right]_{\theta = \theta_{1,t}(z_t)} \quad \text{(C.2.6a)}$$

$$[\theta_n : n \geq 2] : \quad \phi_t + c(\varphi_t) = \left( \psi_{n,t}(z_t) - \psi_{n-1,t}(z_t) \right) \left[ \frac{\partial \eta(\theta)}{\partial \theta} \right]_{\theta = \theta_{n,t}(z_t)} \quad \text{(C.2.6b)}$$

As for the second set of conditions, we have:

$$[S_0] : \quad -\partial_t \psi_{0,t} + r \psi_{0,t} = -\kappa(\varphi_t) - (\phi_t + c(\varphi_t)) \sum_{z_t \in Z} \theta_1(z_t) \quad \text{(C.2.7a)}$$

$$\begin{align*}
[S_{n_t}(z_t)] : \quad -\partial_t \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) + r \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) &= n_t (v(\varphi_t) - \phi_t) - (\phi_t + c(\varphi_t)) \theta_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) - C(n_t, z_t; \varphi_t) \\
&+ \sum_{\delta t} \psi_{0,t} - \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) + n_t \delta_t \left( \psi_{n_t-1,t}(z_t) - \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) \right) \\
&+ \eta(\theta_{n_t+1}(z_t)) \left( \psi_{n_t+1,t}(z_t) - \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) \right) + \sum_{z_t \in Z} \lambda_z(z_t) \left( \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) - \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) \right)
\end{align*} \quad \text{(C.2.7b)}$$

for given $z_t \in Z$, where in the last line we have used that $\lambda_z(z_t) = -\sum_{z \neq z_t} \lambda_z(z_t)$ for all $z \in Z$, by the properties of the Markov chain.

We now show that a block-recursive equilibrium with non-negative entry of firms satisfies the optimality conditions of the planner by appropriately choosing the co-state variables of the planning problem. By equations (C.2.7a)-(C.2.7b), the co-state variables can be represented as HJB equations. Equations (C.2.6a)-(C.2.6b) are the corresponding first order conditions of those equations. Therefore, it suffices to find the values of the multipliers for which the HJB equations of the planner coincide with the joint surplus problem of the decentralized allocation.

Pick a decentralized equilibrium allocation $\{W_n(z, \varphi), x_n(z, \varphi), \theta_n(z, \varphi), U^B(\varphi) : (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathbb{N} \times Z \times \Phi\}$, and consider the following realization for the multipliers:

$$\begin{align*}
\phi_t(\varphi_t) &= rU^B(\varphi_t) \\
\psi_{0,t}(\varphi_t) &= 0 \\
\forall n_t, z_t : \quad \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t, \varphi_t) &= W_{n_t}(z_t, \varphi_t) - n_tU^B(\varphi_t)
\end{align*}$$

Under this guess, notice that $\partial_t \psi_{0,t} = \partial_t \psi_{n_t,t}(z_t) = 0$, $\forall n \geq 1$. Moreover, the multipliers depend only on the current realization of the aggregate state, and not the entire history. Further, for a sufficiently low value of $\kappa$, we can impose strictly positive entry and therefore $\partial_t = 0$, $\forall t$.

Plugging these guesses into (C.2.7b), after some simple algebra we obtain:

$$(r + \delta_t)W_{n_t}(z_t, \varphi_t) = n_t \left( v(\varphi_t) + (\delta_f + \delta_c)U^B(\varphi_t) \right) - C(n_t, z_t; \varphi_t)$$
except for the second line in square brackets. Using that \( \eta(\theta) = \theta \mu(\theta) \) and \( x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) = U^B(\varphi) + \frac{rU^B(\varphi) + c(\varphi)}{\mu(\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi))} \) by inactive buyers’ indifference, we obtain:

\[
(rU^B(\varphi_t) + c(\varphi_t))\theta_{n+1,t}(z_t) + \eta(\theta_{n+1}(z_t))U^B(\varphi_t) = \eta(\theta_{n+1,t}(z_t, \varphi_t))x_{n+1,t}(z_t, \varphi_t) \tag{C.2.8}
\]

Using this into the above equation and grouping terms, we will then recognize the value of the joint surplus in the decentralized solution, equation (10).

Similarly, plugging the guess for the multipliers into (C.2.7a), we obtain:

\[
\kappa(\varphi_t) = -(rU^B(\varphi_t) + c(\varphi_t))\sum_{z_t \in Z} \theta_1(z_t) + \sum_{z^* \in Z} \pi_{z^*}(z^*)\eta(\theta_{1,t}(z^*))\left(W_1(z^*) - U^B(\varphi_t)\right)
\]

A final manipulation using (C.2.8) again then allows us to obtain the free entry condition in the decentralized allocation, equation (13).

Summing up, under an appropriate choice of the co-states, the planner’s solution is equivalent to the problem of the decentralized economy. Hence, the equilibrium is constrained-efficient. \( \square \)

### C.3 Proof of Proposition 3: Joint Surplus Solution

**Proof.** The equilibrium allocation is composed of sequences:

\[
\{W_n(z, \varphi), x_n(z, \varphi), \theta_n(z, \varphi), p_n(z, \varphi) : (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathbb{N} \times Z \times \Phi\}
\]

satisfying equations (10), (11), and (15), where the free entry condition (13) pins down \( x_1 \) and the first-order condition (12) pins down \( x_n \) given \( x_{n-1}, n \geq 2, \) for any \( \varphi \in \Phi. \)

For \( \mu(\theta) = \theta^{\gamma-1}, \gamma \in (0, 1), \) equation (11) defines the following equilibrium mapping:

\[
\theta : (x; \varphi) \mapsto \left(\frac{x - U^B(\varphi)}{\Gamma^B(\varphi)}\right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} \tag{C.3.1}
\]

Some algebra shows that equation (12) can be written as:

\[
W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi) - x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) = \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \left(x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi)\right) \tag{C.3.2}
\]

One can also write this condition as:

\[
x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi) = \gamma \left(W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi)\right) \equiv \Gamma_{n+1}(z, \varphi)
\]
showing that the buyer absorbs a fraction $\gamma$ of the marginal gains from matching, $\Gamma_{n+1}(z, \varphi)$.

Next, define:

$$\Gamma_n^S(z, \varphi) \equiv (r + \delta_f)W_n(z, \varphi) - \pi_n(z, \varphi) + n\delta_c\left(W_n(z, \varphi) - W_{n-1}(z, \varphi)\right) - n(\delta_c + \delta_f)U^B(\varphi) - \Xi_n(z, \varphi) \quad (C.3.3)$$

where $\pi_n(z, \varphi) \equiv n\nu(\varphi) - C(n; z, \varphi)$ is the flow joint surplus, and:

$$\Xi_n(z, \varphi) \equiv \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \lambda_z(z'|z)W_n(z', \varphi) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi)W_n(z, \varphi')$$

is the expected value of the joint surplus across exogenous states. Next, note:

$$\Gamma_n^S(z, \varphi) = \eta\left(\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)\right)\left(W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi) - x_{n+1}(z, \varphi)\right)$$

$$= \left(1 - \frac{\gamma}{\gamma}\right)\eta\left(\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)\right)\left(x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi)\right)$$

$$= \left(1 - \frac{\gamma}{\gamma}\right)\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)\Gamma^B(\varphi)$$

where the first line uses the HJB equation for the joint surplus (equation (10)), the second line uses (C.3.2), and the third line uses (C.3.1) and $\eta(\theta) = \theta\mu(\theta)$. The right-hand side of the first equality allows us to interpret $\Gamma^S$ as the expected match surplus for the seller (see main text).

Using the last equality, we have found the market tightness:

$$\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi) = \left(\frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma}\right)\frac{\Gamma_n^S(z, \varphi)}{\Gamma^B(\varphi)} \quad (C.3.4)$$

for all $n \geq 1$. Finally, we can write (C.3.2) as:

$$W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi) = U^B(\varphi) + \frac{1}{\gamma}(x_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi)) = U^B(\varphi) + \frac{1}{\gamma}\Gamma^B(\varphi)\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)^{1-\gamma}$$

Using (C.3.4) and rearranging terms, we obtain our desired result:

$$W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) = W_n(z, \varphi) + U^B(\varphi) + \frac{\Gamma^B(\varphi)}{\gamma} \left(\frac{\Gamma_n^S(z, \varphi)}{1 - \gamma}\right)^{1-\gamma} \quad (C.3.5)$$

This is a second-order difference equation in $n$. The boundary conditions are $W_0 = 0$ (as the joint value is nil when the seller has no customers), and $W_1$ set to satisfy the free entry condition (13). By (C.3.2), we know that $W_1 - x_1 = (1 - \gamma)(W_1 - U^B)$ and $x_1 - U^B = \gamma(W_1 - U^B)$, and thus we can write (13) as:

$$\kappa(\varphi) = (1 - \gamma)\left(\frac{\Gamma^B(\varphi)}{\gamma}\right)^{1-\gamma} \sum_{z_0 \in \mathcal{Z}} \pi_z(z_0)\left(W_1(z_0, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi)\right)^{1-\gamma}$$

our desired result. \qed
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4: Invariant Distribution

Proof. Let \( \{ \theta_n(z, \varphi) : (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \} \) be an equilibrium collection of market tightness levels, where \( \mathcal{N} = \{1, \ldots, \pi\} \), and \( \pi < +\infty \) is a large integer. In matrix notation, for each aggregate state \( \varphi \in \Phi \), equations (19)-(20)-(21) can be written succinctly as:

\[
\partial_t S_t(\varphi) = T(\varphi) S_t(\varphi)
\]

(C.4.1)

where \( S_t(\varphi) \equiv (S_{0,t}(\varphi), S_{1,t}^\top, \ldots, S_{\pi,t}^\top) \), with \( S_{n,t} \equiv (S_{n,t}(z_1), \ldots, S_{n,t}(z_{k_z}))^\top \), and \( T(\varphi) \) is the partitioned matrix:

\[
T(\varphi) \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
  t_{11} & \delta^\top_j + \delta^\top_c & \delta^\top_j & \delta^\top_j & \cdots & \delta^\top_j & \delta^\top_j & \delta^\top_j \\
  \eta^\top_1(\varphi) & \mathbf{D}_1(\varphi) & \delta_{2,c} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & \cdots & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} \\
  0_{k_z \times 1} & \eta_2(\varphi) & \mathbf{D}_2(\varphi) & \delta_{3,c} & \cdots & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} \\
  \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
  0_{k_z \times 1} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & \cdots & \mathbf{D}_{\pi-1}(\varphi) & \delta_{\pi-1,c} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} \\
  0_{k_z \times 1} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & \cdots & \eta_{\pi-1}(\varphi) & \mathbf{D}_{\pi-1}(\varphi) & \delta_{\pi,c} \\
  0_{k_z \times 1} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & \cdots & 0_{k_z \times k_z} & \eta_\pi(\varphi) & \mathbf{D}_\pi(\varphi)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where \( t_{11} \equiv -\sum_z \pi_z(z) \theta_1(z, \varphi) \) is a scalar, \( 0_{p \times q} \) denotes a \( p \times q \) matrix of zeros, and \( T(\varphi) \) is a \( K \times K \) square matrix, where \( K = 1 + \pi k_z \). Further, we have defined the \( 1 \times k_z \) row vectors:

\[
\delta_j \equiv (\delta_f, \ldots, \delta_f); \quad \delta_c \equiv (\delta_c, \ldots, \delta_c); \quad \eta^\top_1(\varphi) \equiv (\pi_z(z_1) \theta_1(z_1, \varphi), \ldots, \pi_z(z_{k_z}) \theta_1(z_{k_z}, \varphi));
\]

and the \( k_z \times k_z \) matrices:

\[
\forall n = 2, \ldots, \pi: \quad \delta_{n,c} \equiv \text{diag}(n \delta_c, \ldots, n \delta_c); \quad \eta_n(\varphi) \equiv \text{diag}(\theta_n(z_1, \varphi), \ldots, \theta_n(z_{k_z}, \varphi));
\]

\[
\forall n = 1, \ldots, \pi: \quad \mathbf{D}_n(\varphi) \equiv \begin{pmatrix}
  d_n(z_1, \varphi) & \lambda_z(z_1 | z_2) & \cdots & \lambda_z(z_1 | z_{k_z}) \\
  \lambda_z(z_2 | z_1) & d_n(z_2, \varphi) & \cdots & \lambda_z(z_2 | z_{k_z}) \\
  \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
  \lambda_z(z_{k_z} | z_1) & \lambda_z(z_{k_z} | z_2) & \cdots & d_n(z_{k_z}, \varphi)
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where \( \text{diag}(\cdot) \) denotes a diagonal matrix, and the diagonal elements of \( \mathbf{D}_n(\varphi) \) are given by:

\[
d_n(z_j, \varphi) \equiv \begin{cases}
  - (\delta_j + n \delta_c + \theta_{n+1}(z_j, \varphi) + \sum_{\ell \neq j} \lambda_z(z_\ell | z_j)) & \text{for } n = 1, \ldots, \pi - 1 \\
  - (\delta_j + n \delta_c + \sum_{\ell \neq j} \lambda_z(z_\ell | z_j)) & \text{for } n = \pi
\end{cases}
\]

System (C.4.1) describes an irreducible Markov chain, as any state \( (n', z') \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \) can be reached almost surely from some \( (n, z) \neq (n', z') \). Moreover, the Markov chain is aperiodic. These properties, plus the fact that the state space is finite, guarantee that the Markov chain is ergodic. Therefore, by Theorem 11.2 of Stokey and Lucas (1989), the system converges to a unique steady-state distribution \( S^*(\varphi) \), for each \( \varphi \in \Phi \).
For the analytical characterization, note that the transition matrix $T_\varphi$ is constant, so we can solve the differential equation (C.4.1) directly. The solution is:

$$S_t(\varphi) = e^{T_\varphi t}S_0(\varphi)$$

where the initial distribution $S_0(\varphi) \in \mathbb{R}_+^K$ is given. To compute $e^{T_\varphi t}$, consider the eigenvalue decomposition $T_\varphi = E_\varphi \Lambda_\varphi E_\varphi^{-1}$, where $\Lambda_\varphi \equiv (\lambda_1(\varphi), \ldots, \lambda_K(\varphi))$ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues, and $E_\varphi$ collects the corresponding eigenvectors. Defining $Z_t(\varphi) \equiv E_\varphi^{-1}S_t(\varphi)$, then $\partial_t Z_t(\varphi) = \Lambda_\varphi Z_t(\varphi)$, and because $\Lambda_\varphi$ is a diagonal matrix, we can solve this differential equation element-by-element, i.e. $\partial_t Z_{i,t}(\varphi) = \lambda_i(\varphi) Z_{i,t}(\varphi)$ for each $i = 1, \ldots, K$. This is a simple system of ODEs with solution:

$$Z_{i,t}(\varphi) = c_i e^{\lambda_i(\varphi)t}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, K$$

where $c_i \in \mathbb{R}$ is the constant of integration. Since $S_t(\varphi) = E_\varphi Z_t(\varphi)$, we have obtained:

$$S_t(\varphi) = \sum_{i=1}^K c_i e^{\lambda_i(\varphi)t} v_i$$

(C.4.2)

where $v_i$ is the $K \times 1$ eigenvector associated to the $i$-th eigenvalue. Therefore, the stability of system (C.4.2) as $t \to +\infty$ depends on the sign of the eigenvalues of $T_\varphi$. The trace of $T_\varphi$ is:

$$tr(T_\varphi) = \sum_{i=1}^K \lambda_i(\varphi) = -k_z \pi(z) \eta(\theta(\varphi)) + \sum_{n=1}^\pi k_z \sum_{j=1}^{d_n(z)} < 0$$

The trace being unambiguously negative means that there is at least one negative eigenvalue, if not more. Letting $1 \leq \ell \leq K$ denote the number of negative eigenvalues, and re-ordering the eigenvalues from small to large with no loss of generality, we can then impose $c_j = 0, \forall j \in \{\ell + 1, \ell + 2, \ldots, K\}$, on equation (C.4.2), and let $t \to +\infty$ to find the stable solution. That is:

$$S^*(\varphi) = \lim_{t \to +\infty} \sum_{j=1}^\ell c_j e^{\lambda_j(\varphi)t} v_j \in \mathbb{R}_+^K$$

is the unique invariant distribution of sellers in state $\varphi \in \Phi$. □

**D Model Extensions**

**D.1 Endogenous Customer Separations**

To introduce customer seller-to-seller transitions, we can model customer search explicitly. While we assume that there is still an exogenous risk $\delta_c > 0$ of separation for each customer, additionally we now add the possibility that customers search, and potentially endogenously separate, while on the match. We assume that active buyers do not face a cost of search, as they do not discontinue their consumption when transitioning from one seller to the another.

Introducing this additional dimension into our full model with aggregate shocks is not at all straightforward. Endogenous buyer transitions across sellers would break the ex-ante indifference condition among inactive buyers, which in our baseline setting is key to pin down equilibrium market tightness. In order to preserve the block-recursive structure, one remedy would be to assume free
entry across all markets on the seller side. This would change the environment substantially, so we leave it for future work.

Thus, suppose there are no aggregate shocks. The problem of an active buyer with value $V^B$ is:

$$\max_{x \in [V^B, x]} \mu(\theta(x))(x - V^B)$$

Note that the matched buyer only considers offers that deliver an expected value that weakly dominates the current perceived utility, $V^B$. Let $\tilde{x}(n, \omega; z)$ be the policy for a customer in a firm of type $(n, z)$ under contract $\omega$. The first-order condition reads:

$$\left(\tilde{x}(n, \omega; z) - V^B(n, \omega; z)\right) \frac{\partial \mu(\theta(x))}{\partial x} \bigg|_{x = \tilde{x}(n, \omega; z)} = -\mu\left(\theta(\tilde{x}(n, \omega; z))\right) \quad (D.1.1)$$

Intuitively, the inactive buyer trades off the expected option value of transitioning (left-hand side) to the rate at which this offer can be obtained (right-hand side). Since we focus on equilibria in which market tightness is an increasing function of promised utilities, it is not difficult to show (e.g. Shi (2009)) that $\tilde{x}(n, \omega; z)$ is increasing in $V^B(n, \omega; z)$. In words, the more profitable a match is ex-post, the higher the offer for which the customer will apply next. Therefore, customers separate according to their initial state, and climb up the utility ladder. This effect tends to shift the mass of customers (and therefore sellers) toward higher promised utilities, and thus acts as a countervailing force to the equilibrium dynamics of the baseline model: when the sellers offering the worst terms of trade lose customers, they need to start setting up more favorable contracts.

The risk of endogenously losing customers must now be incorporated into the pricing decisions of sellers. The buyers’ and seller’s HJB equations are then identical to (5) and (6), respectively, except that we now must replace $\delta_c$ by an “effective” customer separation rate, given by:

$$\tilde{\delta}_c(n, \omega; z) \equiv \delta_c + \mu\left(\theta(\tilde{x}(n, \omega; z))\right)$$

Likewise, the market tightness must incorporate that the pool of searching buyers is composed of both inactive as well as active buyers:

$$\theta_n(z) = \frac{1}{S_{n-1}(z)} \left(B^I_n(z) + B^A_{\iota(n)}(z)\right)$$

for any $n \geq 1$, where $\iota(n) \in \mathbb{N}$ is the size of the seller that a customer seeking to transition to a size-$n$ seller is currently matched with, i.e. the solution to $x_n(z) = \tilde{x}(\iota(n), \omega; z)$.

### D.2 Price Discrimination

The assumption of no price discrimination across different customers is not key to generate efficient firm dynamics. We argue that:

- So long as we maintain the assumption of dynamic contracts with commitment, our model still generates these dynamics as well as cross-sectional price dispersion.
- Allowing for price discrimination leads to equilibrium indeterminacy.

If sellers were to use prices as their only instrument for customer attraction (instead of recursive contracts with price-utility pairs), an equilibrium with price discrimination across customers of different tenures would look similar to that of Gourio and Rudanko (2014b): firms would attract
customers by offering an instantaneous discount on the valuation \( v \), and extract all surplus by charging \( v \) immediately after the customer joins the seller, and until separation. However, assuming price discrimination in our model does not yield this result. This is because sellers must still trade off static payoffs coming from the current price with dynamic ones coming from the promised utilities.

Importantly, under price discrimination, tractability is preserved along several dimensions:

(i.) The seller’s and the joint surplus problem are equivalent;
(ii.) The joint surplus is constant in the distribution of contracts across customers;
(iii.) As a novelty, there is equilibrium price indeterminacy.

Let us discuss these results more formally. First, we must extend our baseline framework to allow for discrimination across buyers. Let \( \omega_i = \{ p_i, x_i'(n'; s') \} \) be the contract offered to the typical customer \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), which is composed of an individual-specific price level \( p_i \), and a personalized menu of continuation utilities \( x_i'(n'; s') \), one for each \( n' \in \{ n - 1, n, n + 1 \} \) and \( s' \in \{(z', \varphi), (z, \varphi')\} \). A seller is characterized by the collection \( \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n \) of outstanding promises, and must choose: (i) a menu of contracts \( \{ \omega_i \}_{i=1}^n \) for the \( n \) current customers; and (ii) a starting promised utility \( x_0' \in \mathbb{R} \) for the new incoming customer (if there is any).

The HJB equation for the seller now reads:

\[
rvS(n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) = \max_{x_0' \in \mathcal{W}} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n p_i - C(n; z, \varphi) + \delta f \left( V_0^S(\varphi) - V^S(n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \right) + \delta_c \sum_{j=1}^n \left( V^S(n-1, \{ x_i'(n-1; z, \varphi) \}_{i=1}^n \setminus \{ x_j'(n-1; z, \varphi) \}; z, \varphi) - V^S(n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \right) + \eta(\theta(x_0'; \varphi)) \left( V^S(n+1, \{ x_i'(n+1; z, \varphi) \}_{i=1}^n \cup \{ x_0' \}; z, \varphi) - V^S(n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \lambda_z(z'|z) \left( V^S(n, \{ x_i'(n; z', \varphi) \}_{i=1}^n; z', \varphi) - V^S(n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_\varphi(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( V^S(n, \{ x_i'(n; z, \varphi') \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi') - V^S(n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \right) \right\}
\]

where \( \setminus \) and \( \cup \) are multiset difference and union operators. The most important differences relative to the baseline model (equation (6)) have been highlighted in blue. Note that, now, when a customer \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) separates, the vector of promised utilities shrinks in cardinality and the customers that remain obtain the new promise \( x_i'(n-1; z, \varphi) \). The firm attracts new buyers by offering a starting utility \( x_0' \) to the entering customer, while delivering the promised level \( x_i'(n+1; z, \varphi) \) to each of the remaining \( n \) customers. The promise-keeping constraint now reads:

\[
\forall i = 1, \ldots, n : \quad x_i \leq V^B(n, \omega_i; z, \varphi)
\]

for all \( (z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \), establishing that the firm commits to each and every customer. We then solve for the optimal menu of contracts by solving for the joint surplus problem:

**Lemma 1 (Joint Surplus Equivalence under Price Discrimination)** In the economy with price discrimination, the seller’s and the joint surplus problems are equivalent:

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43 These operators are defined by \( \{ a, b, b \} \setminus \{ b \} = \{ a, b \} \) and \( \{ a, b \} \cup \{ b \} = \{ a, b, b \} \), and they are needed here because the vector of promised utilities may contain more than one instance of the same element.
(i) Given a menu of contracts $\omega_i = \{p_i, x'_i(n'; s')\}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ that maximize the seller’s value subject to the promise-keeping constraint, $\{x'_i(n'; s')\}_{i=1}^n$ maximizes:

$$W(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \equiv V^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i;$$

(ii) Conversely, for every $\{x'_i(n'; s')\}_{i=1}^n$ that maximizes $W(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi)$, there exists a menu of personalized price levels $\{p_i\}_{i=1}^n$ such that the collection $\{p_i, x'_i(n'; s')\}_{i=1}^n$ constitutes a solution to the seller’s problem.

**Proof.** The argument is conceptually similar to that of the baseline model (see Appendix C.1). Let $\{\pi'_i, \{\varpi_i\}_{i=1}^n\}$ be a generic policy for the firm, with $\varpi_i \equiv \{p_i, x'_i(n'; s')\}$ and $x'_i(n'; s') = \pi'_i(n + 1; z, \varphi), \pi'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi), \{x'_i(n; z', \varphi) : z' \in Z\}, \{x'_i(n; z, \varphi') : \varphi' \in \Phi\}$, for $i = 1, \ldots, n$. The firm’s problem can be written as:

$$V^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \equiv \max_{\pi'_0, \{\varpi_i\}_{i=1}^n} \bar{V}^S(n; \pi'_0, \{\varpi_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \text{ s.t. } x_i \leq V^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi), \forall i = 1, \ldots, n$$

where:

$$\bar{V}^S(n; \pi'_0, \{\varpi_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \equiv \frac{1}{\rho(n; z, \varphi)} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n \pi_i - C(n; z, \varphi) + \delta_c \sum_{j=1}^n V^S(n - 1, \{\pi'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi)\}_{i=1}^n \cup \{\pi'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi)\}; z, \varphi) + \eta(\theta(\pi'_0; \varphi)) V^S(n + 1, \{\pi'_i(n + 1; z, \varphi)\}_{i=1}^n \cup \{\pi'_0\}; z, \varphi) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z' | z) V^S(n, \{\pi'_i(n; z', \varphi')\}_{i=1}^n; z', \varphi') + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi'}(\varphi' | \varphi) V^S(n, \{\pi'_i(n; z, \varphi')\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi') \right]$$

is the value of the seller, with $\rho(n; z, \varphi) \equiv r + \delta_f + n\delta_c + \eta(\theta(\pi'_0; \varphi))$ being the effective discount rate. The value of buyer $i = 1, \ldots, n$ under this policy is:

$$rV^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi) = v(\varphi) - p_i + (\delta_f + \delta_c) \left( U^B(\varphi) - V^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi) \right) + (n - 1)\delta_c \left( \pi'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi) - V^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi) \right) + \eta(\theta(\pi'_0; \varphi)) \left( \pi'_i(n + 1; z, \varphi) - V^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z' | z) \left( \pi'_i(n; z', \varphi') - V^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi'}(\varphi' | \varphi) \left( \pi'_i(n; z, \varphi') - V^B(n, \varpi_i; z, \varphi) \right)$$

Notice that the firm is re-optimizing after changing size. By monotonicity of preferences, the promise-keeping constraint will bind for each customer.
\[ x_i = V^B(n, \overline{w}_i; z, \varphi), \quad \forall i = 1, \ldots, n \]

From this equation, we can solve for the promise-compatible price level to be charged to each customer under the policy \( \{ \overline{x}_i, \{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n \} \):

\[
p_i^{PK} \left( \{ \overline{x}_i, \{ \overline{x}_j'(n'; s') \}_{j \neq i} \} \right) = v(\varphi) - \rho(n; z, \varphi)x_i + \delta_f U^B(\varphi) + \delta_e \left( U^B(\varphi) + (n - 1)\overline{x}_i(n - 1; z, \varphi) \right) + \eta(\theta(\overline{x}_0); \varphi)\overline{x}_i(n + 1; z, \varphi) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z)\overline{x}_i(n; z', \varphi) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi)\overline{x}_i(n; z, \varphi')
\]

(D.2.2)

Importantly, note that the price level for a specific customer \( i \) is independent of the distribution of utilities for all the *other* customers, that is:

\[
p_i^{PK} \left( \{ \overline{x}_j'(n'; s') \}_{j \neq i} \cup + \{ \overline{x}_j'(n'; s') \} \right) = p_i^{PK} \left( \{ \overline{x}_j'(n'; s') \}_{\phi(j) \neq i} \cup + \{ \overline{x}_j'(n'; s') \} \right)
\]

for any arbitrary bisection \( \phi : \{1, \ldots, n\} \to \{1, \ldots, n\} \). Therefore, since the firm’s problem internalizes the price level, the resulting maximization should be independent of the distribution of utilities. Indeed, plugging (D.2.2) into (D.2.1) and rearranging terms yields:

\[
\tilde{W} \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; \overline{x}_0', \{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n ; z, \varphi \right) \equiv \frac{1}{\rho(n; z, \varphi)} \left[ n v(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_e) U^B(\varphi) \right] - \left( C(n; z, \varphi) + \eta(\theta(\overline{x}_0); \varphi) \sum_{i=1}^n \overline{x}_i(n + 1; z, \varphi) \right)
+ \delta_e \sum_{j=1}^n W\left( n - 1, \{ \overline{x}_i(n - 1; z, \varphi) \}_{i=1}^n \setminus \{ \overline{x}_j'(n - 1; z, \varphi) \}; z, \varphi \right)
+ \eta(\theta(\overline{x}_0'; \varphi)) W\left( n + 1, \{ \overline{x}_i'(n + 1) \}_{i=1}^n \cup + \{ \overline{x}_0 \}; z, \varphi \right)
+ \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z) W\left( n, \{ \overline{x}_i'(n; z', \varphi) \}_{i=1}^n \cup + \{ \overline{x}_0 \}; z', \varphi \right)
+ \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) W\left( n, \{ \overline{x}_i'(n; z, \varphi') \}_{i=1}^n \cup + \{ \overline{x}_0 \}; z, \varphi' \right)
\]

(D.2.3)

where we have defined:

\[
\tilde{W} \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; \overline{x}_0', \{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n ; z, \varphi \right) \equiv \tilde{V}^S \left( n; \overline{x}_0', \{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n ; z, \varphi \right) + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i
\]

and:

\[
W\left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n ; z, \varphi \right) \equiv \max_{\overline{x}_0 (\{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n )} \tilde{W} \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; \overline{x}_0', \{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n ; z, \varphi \right)
\]

as the joint surplus under policy \( \{ \overline{x}_0', \{ \overline{w}_i \}_{i=1}^n \} \), and the *maximized* joint surplus, respectively.
Finally, noting that the right-hand side of (D.2.3) does not depend on the initial distribution of utilities \( \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n \) nor the price level, we can write the joint surplus under a given policy as:

\[
\bar{W}(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n, \{\omega_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) = \bar{W}_n(\{x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi)
\]

This allows us to break up the optimal contracting problem into two separate stages. Where \( \{x'_0, \{p_i^*, x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n\} \) denotes an optimal contract, we have:

\[
\{x'_0, \{x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n\} = \arg \max \bar{W}_n(\{x'_0, \{x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi)
\]

\[
p_i^* = p_i^{PK}(\{x'_0, \{x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n\}), \quad \forall i = 1, \ldots, n
\]

Thus, the joint surplus and the seller’s problems are equivalent. □

The characterization of the equilibrium is also similar to the baseline model. First, by utility-invariance of the joint surplus we can write:

\[
\forall(n, z, \varphi) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z} \times \Phi: \quad W_n(z, \varphi) = W(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi) \quad (D.2.4)
\]

Letting \( \{x'_0, \{x'_{i,n+1}(z, \varphi)\}_{i=1}^n\} \) be the set of optimal policies, the joint surplus solves the second-order difference equation:

\[
(r + \delta_f)W_n(z, \varphi) = n\nu(\varphi) - C(n; z, \varphi) + n(\delta_f + \delta_c)U^B(\varphi)
\]

\[
+ \eta(\theta(x'_0; \varphi)) \left(W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi) - \sum_{i=1}^n x'_{i,n+1}(z, \varphi)\right)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{z' \in \mathbb{Z}} \lambda_z(z'|z) \left(W_n(z', \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi)\right)
\]

\[
+ \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) \left(W_n(z, \varphi') - W_n(z, \varphi)\right)
\]

Thus, only the aggregate utility \( \sum_{i=1}^n x'_{i,n+1}(z, \varphi) \) is relevant from a joint-surplus perspective, so there is now a multiplicity of contracts that can be sustained in the optimal allocation.\(^{44}\) This is stated formally in the following lemma:

**Lemma 2 (Price Indeterminacy)** There is a continuum of joint-surplus-maximizing contracts \( \{p^*_i, x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n \) that leave both the buyers and the seller indifferent.

**Proof.** Pick \( \varepsilon \in \mathbb{R} \) arbitrarily. The goal of the proof is to show that there is some \( \beta_n(\varphi) > 0 \) (possibly a function of size and the aggregate state) for which, if a given contract with \( \omega^b = \{p_i + \varepsilon\beta_n(\varphi), x'_i(n';s') + \varepsilon\}_{i=1}^n \) is optimal, then each customer and the seller maximize their value under contract \( \omega^a = \{p_i, x'_i(n';s')\}_{i=1}^n \). The value of contract \( \omega^b \) for customer \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) is:

\[
rV^B(n, \omega^b_i; z, \varphi) = v(\varphi) - p_i - \varepsilon\beta_n(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_c)\left(U^B(\varphi) - V^B(n, \omega_i; z, \varphi)\right)
\]

\(^{44}\) Additional equilibria may exist in non-Markovian environments. Here we only point out that equilibrium uniqueness is lost in Markov Perfect equilibria when sellers can discriminate.
\[+ (n - 1) \delta_c \left( x'_1(n - 1; z, \varphi) + \varphi - V^B(n, \omega^b_i; z, \varphi) \right) + \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi)) \left( x'_1(n + 1; z, \varphi) + \varphi - V^B(n, \omega^b_i; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_2(z'|z) \left( x'_i(n; z', \varphi) + \varphi - V^B(n, \omega_i; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_\varphi(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( x'_i(n; z, \varphi') + \varphi - V^B(n, \omega_i; z, \varphi) \right) = v(\varphi) - p_i - \varepsilon \left( \beta_n(\varphi) - (n - 1) \delta_c - \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi)) \right) + (\delta_f + \delta_c) \left( U^B(\varphi) - V^B(n, \omega_i^b; z, \varphi) \right) + (n - 1) \delta_c \left( x'_1(n - 1; z, \varphi) - V^B(n, \omega_i^b; z, \varphi) \right) + \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi)) \left( x'_1(n + 1; z, \varphi) - V^B(n, \omega_i^b; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_2(z'|z) \left( x'_i(n; z', \varphi) - V^B(n, \omega_i^b; z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_\varphi(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( x'_i(n; z, \varphi') - V^B(n, \omega_i^b; z, \varphi) \right) = rV^B(n, \omega_i^b; z, \varphi) + \varepsilon \left( \beta_n(\varphi) - (n - 1) \delta_c - \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi)) \right) \]

Thus, \( V^B(n, \omega_i^b) = V^B(n, \omega_i^b) \) if, and only if:

\[
\beta_n(\varphi) = (n - 1) \delta_c + \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi)) \quad (D.2.5)
\]

As for the seller’s value, note that:

\[
rV^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) = \max_{x'_0(\varphi), \{ \omega_i \}_{i=1}^n} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n p_i + n \varepsilon \beta_n(\varphi) - C(n; z, \varphi) + \delta_f \left( V^S_0(\varphi) - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) + \delta_c \sum_{j=1}^n \left( V^S(n - 1, \{ x'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi) + \varepsilon \}_{i=1}^n \setminus \{ x'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi) + \varepsilon \}; z, \varphi) - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) + \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi)) \left( V^S(n + 1, \{ x'_i(n + 1; z, \varphi) + \varepsilon \}_{i=1}^n \cup \{ x'_0(\varphi) \}; z, \varphi) - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) + \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_2(z'|z) \left( V^S \left( n, \{ x'_i(n; z', \varphi) + \varepsilon \}_{i=1}^n; z', \varphi \right) - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_\varphi(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( V^S \left( n, \{ x'_i(n; z, \varphi') + \varepsilon \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi' \right) - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) \right\} = \max_{x'_0(\varphi), \{ \omega_i \}_{i=1}^n} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n p_i + n \varepsilon \beta_n(\varphi) - C(n; z, \varphi) + \delta_f \left( V^S_0(\varphi) - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) + \delta_c \sum_{j=1}^n \left( W_{n-1}(z, \varphi) - \sum_{i \neq j} x'_i(n - 1; z, \varphi) - (n - 1) \varepsilon - V^S \left( n, \{ x_i \}_{i=1}^n; z, \varphi \right) \right) \right\}
\]
\[ + \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi))(W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} x'_i(n+1; z, \varphi) - x'_0 - n\varepsilon), \]
\[-V^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{n}; z, \varphi)) \]
\[+ \sum_{z' \in Z} \lambda_z(z'|z)(W_n(z', \varphi) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} x'_i(n; z', \varphi) - n\varepsilon - V^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{n}; z, \varphi)) \]
\[+ \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi)(W_n(z, \varphi') - \sum_{i=1}^{n} x'_i(n; z, \varphi') - n\varepsilon - V^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{n}; z, \varphi)) \]
\[= rV^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{n}; z, \varphi) + n\varepsilon(\beta_n(\varphi) - (n - 1)\delta_c - \eta(\theta(x'_0(\varphi); \varphi))) = rV^S(n, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^{n}; z, \varphi) \]

where we have used the definition of \(W\) in the second equality, and equation (D.2.5) in the last one. In sum, contract \(\{\omega^a_i\}_{i=1}^{n}\) is optimal if, and only if, \(\{\omega^b_i\}_{i=1}^{n}\) is optimal. Generally, these is a continuum of optimal contracts, indexed by \(\varepsilon\). □
Firm Dynamics and Pricing
under Customer Capital Accumulation

by Pau Roldan and Sonia Gilbukh

ONLINE APPENDIX
E Numerical Appendix

E.1 Numerical Implementation of the Exogenous Processes

This appendix shows how to parametrize and estimate \((z, \varphi)\) as continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) processes. The same identical structure applies to both shocks, so let us consider for instance the idiosyncratic shock \((z)\).

The \(k_z \times k_z\) infinitesimal generator matrix \(\Lambda_z\) to be estimated is:

\[
\Lambda_z = \begin{pmatrix}
- \sum_{j \neq 1} \lambda_{1j} & \lambda_{12} & \ldots & \lambda_{1k_z} \\
\lambda_{21} & - \sum_{j \neq 2} \lambda_{2j} & \ldots & \lambda_{2k_z} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\lambda_{k_z 1} & \lambda_{k_z 2} & \ldots & - \sum_{j \neq k_z} \lambda_{k_z j}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

where \(\lambda_{ij}\) is short-hand for \(\lambda_z(z_j|z_i)\), \(z_i, z_j \in \mathbb{Z}\). Since this level of generality would require the estimation of a large number \(k_z(k_z - 1)\) of transition rates, we reduce the parameter space by specializing the CTMC as follows:

- First, we assume \(z\) follows a driftless Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process in logs. An OU process is a type of mean-reverting and autoregressive CTMC which can be loosely viewed as the continuous-time analogue of an AR(1). Formally:

\[
d \log z_t = -\rho_z \log z_t \, dt + \sigma_z \, dB_t
\]

where \(B_t\) is a standard Brownian motion, and \(\rho_z, \sigma_z > 0\) are parameters.

- Operationally, in the numerical version of the model in which time is partitioned and takes values in \(T = \{\Delta, 2\Delta, 3\Delta, \ldots\}\), we use the Euler-Maruyama method, that is:

\[
\log z_{k+1} = (1 - \rho_z \Delta) \log z_k + \sigma_z \sqrt{\Delta} \varepsilon^z_k, \quad \varepsilon^z_k \sim iid \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \quad (E.1)
\]

for each \(k \in T\). This is now an AR(1) processes with autocorrelation \(\tilde{\rho}_z \equiv 1 - \rho_z \Delta\) and variance \(\frac{\sigma_z^2}{\rho_z(1 + \rho_z)}\). Thus, \(\rho_z > 0\) can be seen as a measure of mean-reversion, with lower values corresponding to higher persistence.

- The discrete-time process \((E.1)\) is estimated using the Tauchen (1986) with a discrete-state Markov chain that we define on the theoretical grid, \(Z\). The outcome of this method are estimates for \((\rho_z, \sigma_z)\), and a transition probability matrix \(\Pi_z = (\pi_{ij})\), where \(\pi_{ij}\) denotes the probability of a \(z_i\)-to-\(z_j\) transition in the \(T\) space.

- For the mapping back into continuous time, we use the fact that, for small enough \(\Delta > 0\), transition probabilities are well approximated by transition rates in the following sense:

\[
\forall i = 1, \ldots, k_z: \quad \pi_{ij} \approx \lambda_{ij} \Delta, \forall j \neq i \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_{ii} \approx 1 - \sum_{j \neq i} \lambda_{ij} \Delta
\]

E.2 Stationary Solution Algorithm

To solve for the stationary equilibrium, we implement the following nested procedure:
• First, we solve the maximization of the joint surplus function using a value function iteration (VFI) algorithm, under a guess for $U^B$.

• To update $U^B$, we must check that the free entry condition is satisfied. Combining equations (3) and (13), we can write the equilibrium free entry condition as:

$$
\kappa(\varphi) = \sum_{z_0 \in \mathcal{Z}} \pi_z(z_0) \left\{ \gamma \circ \mu^{-1} \left( \frac{\Gamma^B(\varphi)}{x'_1(z_0, \varphi) - U^B(\varphi)} \right) \left( W_1(z_0, \varphi) - x'_1(z_0, \varphi) \right) \right\}
$$

To find $U^B$, we use a bisection method: increase (or decrease) $U^B$ if there are too many (or too few) entering firms.

Throughout, the state space grid is fixed at $\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi$, where $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \ldots, \bar{n}\}$, $\mathcal{Z} = \{z_i\}_{i=1}^k$, and $\Phi = \{\varphi_j\}_{j=1}^k$. The following describes the steps of the algorithm:

Step 1. Set the counter to $k = 0$. Choose guesses $\underline{U}^{(0)}(\varphi)$ and $\bar{U}^{(0)}(\varphi) \gg \underline{U}^{(0)}(\varphi)$ for each $\varphi \in \Phi$. Set the value of inactivity to:

$$
U^{B(0)}(\varphi) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \underline{U}^{(0)}(\varphi) + \bar{U}^{(0)}(\varphi) \right)
$$

Step 2. For any given $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $n \in \mathcal{N}$, use VFI to find the fixed point $W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi)$ of:

$$(r + \delta_f)W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi) = n \left( v(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_c)U^{B(k)}(\varphi) \right) - C(n, z, \varphi)$$

$$+ n\delta_c\left( W^{(k)}_{n-1}(z, \varphi) - W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi) \right)$$

$$+ \max_{x'_n \in \mathcal{Z}} \left\{ \gamma \circ \mu^{-1} \left( \frac{\Gamma^{B(k)}(\varphi)}{x'_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - U^{B(k)}(\varphi)} \right) \left( W^{(k)}_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi) - x'_{n+1} \right) \right\}$$

$$+ \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \lambda(z'|z) \left( W^{(k)}_n(z', \varphi) - W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi) \right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi') - W^{(k)}_n(z, \varphi) \right)$$

where $\Gamma^{B(k)} = c(\varphi) + rU^{B(k)}(\varphi) - \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda(\varphi'|\varphi) \left( U^{B(k)}(\varphi') - U^{B(k)}(\varphi) \right)$. Store the corresponding policy functions: $\{ x^{(k)}_{n+1}(z, \varphi) : (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \}$.

Step 3. For each $\varphi \in \Phi$, compute the object:

$$
\Delta^{(k)}(\varphi) \equiv \kappa(\varphi) - \sum_{z_0 \in \mathcal{Z}} \pi_z(z_0) \left\{ \gamma \circ \mu^{-1} \left( \frac{\Gamma^{B(k)}(\varphi)}{x'^{(k)}_1(z_0, \varphi) - U^{B(k)}(\varphi)} \right) \left( W^{(k)}_1(z_0, \varphi) - x'^{(k)}_1(z_0, \varphi) \right) \right\}
$$

Stop if $\Delta^{(k)}(\varphi) \in [-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$, $\forall \varphi \in \Phi$, for some small $\varepsilon > 0$. Otherwise, set:

$$
U^{B(k+1)}(\varphi) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \underline{U}^{(k+1)}(\varphi) + \bar{U}^{(k+1)}(\varphi) \right)
$$

for each $\varphi \in \Phi$, where:

(a) If $\Delta^{(k)}(\varphi) > \varepsilon$, then $\underline{U}^{(k+1)}(\varphi) = \underline{U}^{(k)}(\varphi)$ and $\bar{U}^{(k+1)}(\varphi) = U^{B(k)}(\varphi)$;

(b) If $\Delta^{(k)}(\varphi) < -\varepsilon$, then $\underline{U}^{(k+1)}(\varphi) = U^{B(k)}(\varphi)$ and $\bar{U}^{(k+1)}(\varphi) = \bar{U}^{(k)}(\varphi)$;

and go back to Step 2. with $[k] \leftarrow [k + 1]$. 
The VFI algorithm of Step 2 is guaranteed to converge because, given a $U^B$, the joint surplus is a contraction and therefore has a unique fixed point. (For a proof, see Appendix F.3).

F Additional Theoretical Results

F.1 Aggregate Stationary Measures of Agents

To derive aggregate measures, we first must derive the equilibrium *shares* of agent types. Throughout, we fix $\varphi \in \Phi$. Let $g_{n,t}(z) \equiv \frac{S_n(z)}{S_t}$, where $S_t \equiv \sum_{n \geq 1} \sum_z S_{n,t}(z)$ is the total measure of incumbents. After a period of size $\Delta > 0$, the share of firms of size $n \geq 2$ becomes:

$$g_{n,t+\Delta}(z) = \left[ \left( \frac{\theta_{n,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi)}{\theta_{n,t}(z, \varphi)} \right) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n-1,t}(z) + (n+1) \left[ \delta_c + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n+1,t}(z)$$

$$+ \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \left[ \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$+ \left[ 1 - \delta_f \Delta - n \delta_c \Delta - \eta(\theta_{n+1,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi)) \Delta - \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n,t}(z)$$

Subtracting $g_{n,t}(z)$ from both sides of equation (F.1) and dividing by $\Delta$ gives:

$$\frac{g_{n,t+\Delta}(z) - g_{n,t}(z)}{\Delta} = \left[ \left( \frac{\theta_{n,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi)}{\theta_{n,t}(z, \varphi)} \right) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n-1,t}(z) + (n+1) \left[ \delta_c + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n+1,t}(z)$$

$$+ \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \left[ \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{n,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$- \left[ \delta_f + n \delta_c + \eta(\theta_{n+1,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi)) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) \right] g_{n,t}(z)$$

Taking the limit as $\Delta \to 0$:

$$\partial_t g_{n,t}(z) = \left( \frac{\theta_{n,t}(z, \varphi)}{\theta_{n,t}(z, \varphi)} \right) g_{n-1,t}(z) + (n+1) \delta_c g_{n+1,t}(z)$$

$$+ \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) g_{n,t}(\tilde{z}) - \left( \delta_f + n \delta_c \right) g_{n,t}(z)$$

Similarly, when $n = 1$ we have:

$$g_{1,t+\Delta}(z) = \left[ \pi_z(z) \eta(\theta_{1,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi)) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{1,t}(z)$$

$$+ \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \left[ \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{1,t}(\tilde{z})$$

$$+ \left[ 1 - \delta_f \Delta - \delta_c \Delta - \eta(\theta_{2,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi)) \Delta - \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) \Delta + o(\Delta) \right] g_{1,t}(z)$$

A similar derivation on (F.2) shows that, for $n = 1$,.
Then, solving for \(S_{0,t}(\varphi)\) yields a solution for the matrix \(\Phi\), which can be solved numerically on the state-space grid, \(\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi\). For given \(\varphi\), we have:

\[
\partial_t g_{1,t}(z) = \pi_z(z) \eta(\theta_{1,t}(z, \varphi)) \frac{S_{0,t}(\varphi)}{\mathcal{S}_t} + 2 \delta_c g_{2,t}(z) + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_z(z|\tilde{z}) g_{1,t}(\tilde{z})
\]

In the stationary solution, \(\partial_t g_{1,t}(z) = 0\) and \(\mathcal{S}_t = 0\). Then, we obtain a system of second-order equations which can be solved numerically on the state-space grid, \(\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi\). This will yield a solution for the matrix \(\{g_n(z)\}_{n,z}\), and the share of potential entrants per incumbent firm, \(h_0(\varphi) \equiv S_0(\varphi)/\mathcal{S}\).

To compute aggregates, use (17) to obtain \(b_n^A(z) \equiv \frac{B_n(z)}{\mathcal{S}}\) by:

\[
b_n^A(z) = n g_n(z)
\]

Then, \(b^A \equiv B^A/\mathcal{S} = \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \sum_z n g_n(z)\). On the other hand, from equation (16) we know that \(B_n^I(z, \varphi) = S \theta_n(z, \varphi) g_{n-1}(z)\). Therefore, adding across \(n \geq 2\) yields:

\[
\mathcal{S} \sum_{n=2}^{+\infty} \sum_z \theta_n(z, \varphi) g_{n-1}(z) = \sum_{n=2}^{+\infty} \sum_z B_n^I(z, \varphi) = B^I - \sum_z B_1^I(z, \varphi) = 1 - B^A - \sum_z \theta_1(z, \varphi) S_0(\varphi)
\]

Using the definitions above, we can then write:

\[
\mathcal{S} = \frac{1 - \left(b^A + h_0(\varphi) \sum_z \theta_1(z, \varphi)\right) \mathcal{S}}{\sum_{n \geq 2} \sum_z \theta_n(z, \varphi) g_{n-1}(z)}
\]

Solving for \(\mathcal{S}\), we obtain the stationary measure of active sellers:

\[
\mathcal{S} = \left(b^A + h_0(\varphi) \sum_z \theta_1(z, \varphi) + \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \sum_z \theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi) g_n(z)\right)^{-1}
\]

Finally, the mass of potential entrants is \(S_0(\varphi) = \mathcal{S} h_0(\varphi)\), the measure of incumbent sellers is \(S_n = \mathcal{S} g_n\), the measure of active buyers is \(B^A = \mathcal{S} b^A\), and that of inactive buyers is \(B^I = 1 - B^A\).
F.2 Invariant Distribution (Special Case)

Assume an environment without exogenous \((z, \varphi)\) shocks, and let \(\sigma_n = S_n/(S_0 + S)\), for \(n = 0, 1, 2, \ldots\). Then, when \(\delta_f = 0\), we can re-write the flow equations in steady state as:

\[
\eta(\theta_n)\sigma_{n-1} + (n + 1)\delta_c\sigma_{n+1} - (\eta(\theta_n + 1) + n\delta_c)\sigma_n = 0
\]

for any \(n \geq 1\), and \(\delta_c\sigma_1 - \eta(\theta_1)\sigma_0 = 0\). Since \(\sum_{n=0}^{+\infty} \sigma_n = 1\) by construction, \(\{\sigma_n\}\) follows a stationary birth-death process, with Markov transition rates \(\eta(\theta_{n+1})\) and \(n\delta_c\) for transitions \(n \rightarrow (n + 1)\) and \(n \rightarrow (n - 1)\), respectively. Solving for \(n \geq 1\) recursively, we find:

\[
\sigma_n = \frac{1}{n!} \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{\eta(\theta_{i+1})}{(\delta_c)^n} \sigma_0
\]  

(F.1)

Imposing that \(\sum_{n=0}^{+\infty} \sigma_n = 1\) in equation (F.1) yields:

\[
\sigma_0 = \left(1 + \sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{n!} \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{\eta(\theta_{i+1})}{(\delta_c)^n}\right)^{-1}
\]  

(F.2)

From the last expression, it is clear that \(\{\sigma_n\}\) admits an ergodic representation if, and only if:

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{n!} \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{\eta(\theta_{i+1})}{(\delta_c)^n} < +\infty
\]  

(F.3)

Under necessary condition (F.3), the stationary solution of the birth-death process \(\{\sigma_n\}\) is given by (F.1)-(F.2). Using that \(g_n = \sigma_n(1 + S_0/S)\) for \(n \geq 1\), and \(S_0/S = \sigma_0/(1 - \sigma_0)\), we then have:

\[
g_n = \frac{S_0}{S} \frac{1}{n!} \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{\eta(\theta_{i+1})}{(\delta_c)^n}, \quad \text{with} \quad \frac{S_0}{S} = \left[\sum_{n=1}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{n!} \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{\eta(\theta_{i+1})}{(\delta_c)^n}\right]^{-1}
\]

F.3 Existence of the Joint Surplus Function, given \(U^B\)

This section shows that there exists a unique joint surplus \(W\), for each given \(U^B\). First, we define the relevant functional space. Recall that the state space is \(\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi = \{1, \ldots, \bar{n}\} \times \{z_i\}_{i=1}^{k_z} \times \{\varphi_j\}_{j=1}^{k_{\varphi}}\).

**Definition 2** Let \(\mathcal{W}\) be a closed and bounded subspace of vector-valued functions \(\mathcal{W} : \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\), with the following properties:

1. Increasing in \(n\), i.e. \(W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) > W_n(z, \varphi), \forall n \in \mathcal{N}\).
2. Constant at the upper bound of \(\mathcal{N}\), i.e. \(W_\bar{n}(z, \varphi) = W_{\bar{n}+1}(z, \varphi)\).

For a given \(U^B\), the joint surplus can be written as follows:

\[
(r + \delta_f)W_n(z, \varphi) = \max_{\mathcal{W}(n', z', \varphi')} \left\{ n(v(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_c)U^B(\varphi)) - \left(C(n; z, \varphi) + \psi(x'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi) x'(n + 1; z, \varphi)\right) + n\delta_c\left(W_{n-1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi)\right) + \psi(x'(n + 1; z, \varphi); \varphi) \left(W_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi)\right) + \sum_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \lambda(z'|z) \left(W_n(z', \varphi) - W_n(z, \varphi)\right) + \sum_{\varphi' \in \Phi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\varphi'|\varphi) \left(W_n(z, \varphi') - W_n(z, \varphi)\right) \right\}
\]  

(F.1)
where we have used the short-hand notation $\psi(x; \varphi) \equiv \eta \circ \mu^{-1}\left(\frac{I^B(x)}{1-U^B(\varphi)}\right)$. Equation (F.1) is a continuous-time recursive problem. In order to use dynamic programming methods, we first transform it into a form that can be exploited in Blackwell’s Theorem. We do this by a so-called uniformization method. The objective is to construct a set of transition probabilities that mimic those of the continuous-time specification.

For a given vector of current states $\gamma \equiv (n, z, \varphi)$, define $\Gamma \equiv \{0, n-1, n+1\} \times \mathbb{Z} \times \Phi$ as the set of possible future states. Let $\zeta \equiv \{x'(n', z', \varphi') : (n', z', \varphi') \in \Gamma'\} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ denote a set of policies. Let $\mathcal{P}_{\gamma, \gamma'}(\zeta)$ denote the probability of a $\gamma$-to-$\gamma'$ transition under policy $\zeta$. Finally, let $q_\gamma(\zeta)$ be the vector of Markov transition rates for a fixed $\gamma$. Then, we have:

$$
\mathcal{P}_{\gamma, \gamma'}(\zeta) \equiv \frac{1}{q_\gamma(\zeta)} \begin{cases} 
\psi\left(x'(n+1, z, \varphi); \varphi\right) & \text{for } \gamma' = (n+1, z, \varphi) \\
q_{\delta c} & \text{for } \gamma' = (n-1, z, \varphi) \\
q_{\gamma} & \text{for } \gamma' = (0, z, \varphi) \\
\lambda_z(z'|z) & \text{for } \gamma' = (n, z', \varphi), \text{ any } z' \neq z \\
\lambda_\varphi(\varphi'|\varphi) & \text{for } \gamma' = (n, z, \varphi'), \text{ any } \varphi' \neq \varphi
\end{cases}
$$

and

$$
q_\gamma(\zeta) \equiv \psi\left(x'(n+1, z, \varphi); \varphi\right) + q_{\delta c} + \delta_f + \sum_{z' \neq z} \lambda_z(z'|z) + \sum_{\varphi' \neq \varphi} \lambda_\varphi(\varphi'|\varphi)
$$

Since the state space is bounded, there exists a $\bar{q}^S < +\infty$ for which $q_\gamma(\zeta) < \bar{q}^S$, for all states $\gamma$, given $\zeta$. Therefore, we can think of transitions actually occurring at rate $\bar{q}$, with a fraction $q_\gamma(\zeta)/\bar{q}$ of them being actual transitions out of state $\gamma$, and the remainder being “fictitious” transitions. Thus, the Markov chain can be represented by the following transition probabilities, including transitions across different states as well as from each state into itself:

$$
\bar{\mathcal{P}}_{\gamma, \gamma'}(\zeta) \equiv \begin{cases} 
\frac{q_\gamma(\zeta)}{\bar{q}} \mathcal{P}_{\gamma, \gamma'}(\zeta) & \text{for } \gamma' \neq \gamma \\
1 - \frac{q_\gamma(\zeta)}{\bar{q}} & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
$$

Finally, define the corresponding discount factor as $\beta \equiv \frac{\bar{q}}{\bar{r} + \bar{q}}$, and the per-period payoff function in state $(n, z, \varphi)$ as:

$$
\bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \zeta) \equiv \frac{1}{\bar{q}} \left[n\left(v(\varphi) + (\delta_f + \delta_c)U^B(\varphi)\right) - (C(n; z, \varphi) + \psi(x'(n+1, z, \varphi); \varphi)x'(n+1, z, \varphi))\right]
$$

We can now state the dynamic optimization problem (F.1) in discretized form:

$$
W_n(z, \varphi) = \max_{\zeta \in \mathcal{X}} \left\{ \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \zeta) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{\mathcal{P}}_{\gamma, \gamma'}(\zeta)W_n(z', \varphi') \right\} \quad (F.2)
$$

We are now ready to prove the main result:

**Lemma 3** For any $(n, z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi$, the joint surplus problem (F.1) admits a unique solution. That is, the mapping $T : \mathcal{W} \to \mathcal{W}$ defined by:

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45 See Ross (1996), Section 5.8. For an application in economics, see Acemoglu and Aksan (2012).
\[ T.W_n(z, \varphi) = \max_{\zeta \subseteq X} \left\{ \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \zeta) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{P}_{\gamma,\gamma'}(\zeta)W_n'(z', \varphi') \right\} \]

has a fixed point \( T.W_n(z, \varphi) = W_n(z, \varphi) \).

Proof. \( T \) is a well-defined mapping from \( W \) to \( W \). We want to show that it defines a contraction. Since \( W \) is closed and \( \zeta \) takes values in a compact set, the contraction property will be enough to invoke Banach’s Fixed Point theorem. Hence, we check that \( T \) satisfies monotonicity and discounting.

- **Monotonicity:** Take \( W^a, W^b \in W \) such that \( W^a_n(z, \varphi) \leq W^b_n(z, \varphi) \), \( \forall (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \). Denote the corresponding optimal policies by:

\[ \hat{\zeta}^i \equiv \arg \max_{\zeta} \left\{ \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \zeta) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{P}_{\gamma,\gamma'}(\zeta)W^i_n'(z', \varphi') \right\} \]

for each \( i = a, b \). Then:

\[
\begin{align*}
T.W^b_n(z, \varphi) &\geq \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \hat{\zeta}^a) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{P}_{\gamma,\gamma'}(\hat{\zeta}^a)W^b_n'(z', \varphi') \\
&\geq \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \hat{\zeta}^a) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{P}_{\gamma,\gamma'}(\hat{\zeta}^a)W^a_n'(z', \varphi') \\
&= T.W^a_n(z, \varphi)
\end{align*}
\]

for any \( (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \), where the first inequality follows by optimality, and the second one follows from \( W^a \leq W^b \).

- **Discounting:** Let \( a \geq 0 \) and \( W \in W \), and denote the optimal policy by \( \hat{\zeta} \). Since \( a \) is a constant, we have that:

\[
\begin{align*}
T.[W + a]_n(z, \varphi) &= \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \hat{\zeta}) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{P}_{\gamma,\gamma'}(\hat{\zeta})\left(W_n'(z', \varphi') + a\right) \\
&= \bar{\Pi}_n(z, \varphi; \hat{\zeta}) + \beta \sum_{\gamma' \in \Gamma'} \bar{P}_{\gamma,\gamma'}(\hat{\zeta})W_n'(z', \varphi') + a\beta \\
&= T.W_n(z, \varphi) + a\beta
\end{align*}
\]

for any \( (n, z, \varphi) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{Z} \times \Phi \). Since \( \beta < 1 \), discounting obtains.

Therefore, for a given \( U^B \), \( T \) defines a contraction in \( W \) with modulus \( \beta \), and by Banach’s fixed-point theorem there exists a unique value function \( W_n(z, \varphi) \) such that \( T.W_n(z, \varphi) = W_n(z, \varphi) \). □

### G Conditional and Aggregate Price Statistics

This section shows how to calculate, using the model’s stationary solution, the conditional and aggregate price statistics that we use in the validation exercise.

Consider a price spell whose starting date is normalized to \( t = 0 \) and which lasts until some unknown time \( T \geq 0 \). Let \( T \) denote the total duration of the price spell, and let \( F : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow [0, 1] \) be
We define the survival function associated to duration $T$ as $S_T^t \equiv \Pr[T \geq t] = 1 - F_t$. The probability that the price spell will end in the $[t, t + \Delta]$ interval is:

$$\Pr[t < T \leq t + \Delta] = S_T^t - S_T^{t + \Delta}$$

The hazard function is defined as $\Pr[t < T \leq t + \Delta|T > t]$. Using Bayes’ rule, we can write the hazard function in terms of the survival function as follows:

$$\Pr[t < T \leq t + \Delta|T > t] = \frac{1}{S_T^{t + \Delta}} \frac{1 - S_T^t}{S_T^t}.$$ Using L’Hôpital’s rule:

$$h_t = -\partial_t \log S_T^t$$

Hence, defining the cumulative hazard as $H_t \equiv \int_t^\infty h_s ds$, the cumulative hazard and the survival functions are related by

$$S_T^t = \exp\{-H_t\}.$$ Using this result, we can write:

$$\Pr[t<T\leq t+\Delta|T>t] = 1 - \exp\{-\int_t^{t+\Delta} h_s ds\} \quad (G.2)$$

Finally, the expected duration of price spells is given by $\mathbb{E}\{T\} = \int_0^\infty t dF_t$. Integrating by parts and using that $S_T^t = 1 - F_t$, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{E}\{T\} = \int_0^\infty S_T^t dt \quad (G.3)$$

**Instantaneous Hazard Rate** Let $T_n(z, \varphi)$ denote the duration of price spells of firm $(n_t, z_t) = (n, z)$ in aggregate state $\varphi \in \Phi$. Conditional on survival, the probability of a price change during the interval $[t, t + \Delta]$, given that the price spell was still ongoing at date $t$, is:

$$\Pr\left[t < T_n(z, \varphi) \leq t + \Delta\bigg| T_n(z, \varphi) > t\right] = \left[\eta(\theta_{n+1,t+\Delta}(z, \varphi))\Delta + o(\Delta)\right] + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \left[\lambda_{z}(\tilde{z}|z)\Delta + o(\Delta)\right] + \sum_{\tilde{\varphi} \neq \varphi} \left[\lambda_{\varphi}(\tilde{\varphi}|\varphi)\Delta + o(\Delta)\right]$$

where $o(\Delta)$ collects higher-order terms. The instantaneous hazard rate (as defined in (G.1)) is:

$$h_n(z, \varphi) = \eta(\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)) + n\delta_c + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_{z}(\tilde{z}|z) + \sum_{\tilde{\varphi} \neq \varphi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\tilde{\varphi}|\varphi)$$

Note the absence of time subscripts in the above expression. This is a convenient implication of our block-recursive structure. Two relevant implications of this result follow:

- The firm-level cumulative hazard is linear in time (though non-linear in the aggregate state):

$$\mathcal{H}_{n,t}(z, \varphi) = h_n(z, \varphi)t \quad (G.4)$$

The survival function, in turn, takes the simple form $S_{n,t}^T(z, \varphi) = \exp\{-h_n(z, \varphi)t\}$.

- The cross-sectional average hazard of price changes is:

$$H_t(\varphi) = \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} g_{n,t}(z) h_n(z, \varphi)$$
where \( g_n(z) = S_{n,t}(z) / \sum_{n,z} S_{n,t}(z) \) is the firm-size probability mass function (p.m.f.).

**Frequency of Price Changes** We define the frequency of price changes over a time window of length one (i.e. \( 1/\Delta \) sub-periods) as the cumulative probability of a price change after a spell of such length. Using equations (G.2) and (G.4)), this probability is:

\[
f_n(z, \varphi) = 1 - \exp \left\{ - h_n(z, \varphi) \right\}
\]

(G.5)

Therefore, the frequency of price changes at the firm-level is a jump variable. The average frequency of price adjustment in the cross-section of firms is:

\[
F_t(\varphi) \equiv \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} g_{n,t}(z) f_n(z, \varphi)
\]

Hence, the aggregate frequency of price changes evolves over time according to the underlying distribution dynamics.

**Expected Duration of Price Spells** From equation (G.4), the price duration \( T_n(z, \varphi) \) follows an exponential distribution with parameter \( h_n(z, \varphi) \). The average duration (equation (G.3)) is then simply the reciprocal of the instantaneous hazard. Expressed in terms of frequency, this means:

\[
E\{T_n(z, \varphi)\} = - \frac{1}{\log(1 - f_n(z, \varphi))}
\]

(G.6)

Then:

\[
D_t(\varphi) \equiv \sum_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \sum_{z \in \mathbb{Z}} g_{n,t}(z) h_n(z, \varphi)
\]

is the average expected duration of prices at time \( t \).

**Moments of the Distribution of Price Changes** Finally, we report moments of the distribution of (non-zero) price log-changes.

- The **expected absolute price change** in market \((n, z)\) is defined as the average log change in prices. Denoting \( \bar{p} \equiv \log p \), we have:

\[
\mu_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) = \eta(\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)) \left| \bar{p}_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) \right| + n \delta_c \left| \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) - \bar{p}_{n-1}(z, \varphi) \right| + \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_{z}(\tilde{z}|z) \left| \bar{p}_{n}(\tilde{z}, \varphi) - \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) \right| + \sum_{\tilde{\varphi} \neq \varphi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\tilde{\varphi}|\varphi) \left| \bar{p}_n(z, \tilde{\varphi}) - \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) \right|
\]

where \(|.|\) denotes the absolute value.

- The **variance** of the distribution of price changes is given by:

\[
\sigma_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) = \eta(\theta_{n+1}(z, \varphi)) \left( \left| \bar{p}_{n+1}(z, \varphi) - \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) \right| - \mu_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) \right)^2 + n \delta_c \left( \left| \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) - \bar{p}_{n-1}(z, \varphi) \right| - \mu_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) \right)^2
\]

\[
+ \sum_{\tilde{z} \neq z} \lambda_{z}(\tilde{z}|z) \left( \left| \bar{p}_{n}(\tilde{z}, \varphi) - \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) \right| - \mu_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) \right)^2 + \sum_{\tilde{\varphi} \neq \varphi} \lambda_{\varphi}(\tilde{\varphi}|\varphi) \left( \left| \bar{p}_n(z, \tilde{\varphi}) - \bar{p}_n(z, \varphi) \right| - \mu_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) \right)^2
\]

where \( \sigma_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) \) denotes the variance of price changes.
At the population level, these moments cannot be aggregated using $g$ (the unconditional firm distribution), for not all firms change prices every period. Instead, we use the so-called renewal distribution of firms, that is, the distribution of firms conditional on a price adjustment:

$$r_{n,t}(z, \varphi) \equiv \frac{g_{n,t}(z)f_n(z, \varphi)}{\sum_{n \in N} \sum_{z \in Z} g_{n,t}(z)f_n(z, \varphi)}$$

Then, the average expected size and the average standard deviation of price changes are:

$$M_\varphi^\Delta(\varphi) \equiv \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{z \in Z} r_{n,t}(z, \varphi)\mu_n^\Delta(z, \varphi) \quad \text{and} \quad \Sigma_\varphi^\Delta(\varphi) \equiv \sum_{n \in N} \sum_{z \in Z} r_{n,t}(z, \varphi)\sqrt{\sigma_n^\Delta(z, \varphi)}$$

respectively.